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I. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical debates about the nature of the corporation have 
raged for over a century, with competing understandings of the cor-
poration holding sway in different regulatory arenas and each view 
making competing claims for normative supremacy.
1
  Far less atten-
tion has been devoted to the nature of the corporate group.
2
  This is 
perhaps surprising given the dominance of corporate groups in the 
global economy and the challenges they pose to traditional legal sys-
tems and governance structures. 
A number of ready explanations for this inattention to the cor-
porate group come from within corporate law itself.  First, contempo-
rary understandings of the firm as a “nexus of contracts” encompass 
both individual corporate entities and large corporate groups equal-
ly.
3
  Because the corporate group is viewed simply as the aggregation 
 
 1 Numerous sources survey the primary positions.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Citizens United & the Corporate Form, 999 WIS. L. REV. 999 (2010); Morton J. Horwitz, 
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990); Michael J. Phil-
lips, How Much Does Corporate Theory Matter? A Response to Professor Boatright, 34 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 239 (1996).  Early contributions include John Dewey, The Historical Back-
ground of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Harold J. Laski, The Per-
sonality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404 (1916); Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate 
Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911); see also infra Part II. 
 2 This is not, however, the case beyond corporate law.  A rich body of literature 
on corporate groups exists within management theory and organizational studies, 
and regulatory scholars also have wrestled with the problem of enterprise or group 
liability.  See, e.g., infra Part II.A., C. (drawing on this scholarship).  Notable contribu-
tions within corporate law include the work of Phillip Blumberg, Peter Muchlinski, 
Janet Dine, and Larry Catá Backer.  See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
(1993); JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2000); PETER T. 
MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW (1995); Larry Catá Backer, 
The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational Law Beyond Asset Parti-
tioning and Legal Personality, 41 TUL. L. REV. 541 (2006); Phillip Blumberg, The Increas-
ing Recognition of Entity Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabili-
ties, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295 (1996).  
 3   See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); see also FRANK H. 
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of its constituent entities, there is little need in corporate law for rules 
concerning the internal “contracts” among the entities comprising 
the corporate group or for rules directed at the corporate group as a 
whole.
4
  Such rules are confined largely to select doctrinal arenas, 
such as veil-piercing and majority shareholder duties.  In addition, 
corporate law in the United States does not recognize the corporate 
group as a separate legal entity form, nor has the United States 
adopted a federal incorporation approach.
5
  As a result, the organiza-
tion and internal affairs of each corporation, regardless of its place in 
a larger “corporate family,” are governed separately by the law of the 
jurisdiction where it is incorporated.
6
 
Another explanation is that the scope of corporate law is limited 
to enabling efficient implicit or explicit contracts among the contrib-
utors to the corporate enterprise.  It is therefore “private” rather than 
“public” law.
7
  Unless current corporate law rules are impeding effi-
cient contracting within or among corporate groups, further regard 
for the nature of the corporate group is unnecessary.  The nature of 
corporate groups, on the other hand, becomes relevant primarily in 
public policy debates about “corporate power.”
8
  Yet setting bounds 
on corporate conduct is more clearly the task of other areas of law, 
such as antitrust, environmental, labor, consumer protection, or tax 
 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
12−13 (1991) (applying contractual theories of the firm to conglomerates and other 
corporate groups).   
 4 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976); see also 
W. RICHARD SCOTT & GERALD F. DAVIS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ORGANIZING: RATIONAL, 
NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVES 232 (2006) (observing that Jensen and 
Meckling’s contractual vision of the firm does not distinguish “internal” contracts 
within a particular corporation or corporate group from “external” contracts with 
third parties; both are contracts for inputs and outputs of the firm). 
 5 But see infra note 27 and accompanying text (introducing comparative perspec-
tives).  
 6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 302–10 (1971) (re-
garding jurisdiction over the corporation’s “internal affairs”).   
 7 See generally Millon, supra note 1 (discussing the public-private tension and its 
influence on theories of the corporation).  Millon ultimately asserts that “corporate 
law is public law.”  Id. at 261; see also KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE 
LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29–39 (2006) (arguing for a 
vision of “corporate law as public law”). 
 8 It is no accident that much of the debate over the nature and purpose of the 
corporation had its origin in the 1930s, when the influence of corporations on socie-
ty began to grow.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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law—not corporate law.
9
  Indeed, many regulatory regimes address-
ing corporate activity in the United States already extend their reach 
beyond the bounds of a single corporation to the corporate group, 
and, in some cases, even extraterritorially.
10
 
At base, perhaps, is the sense that there is little value in theoriz-
ing about corporate groups.  The skeptic might argue that if histori-
cal controversies over the nature of the corporation are any guide, 
their application to corporate groups may well have little bearing on 
actual business practice or on how courts decide cases where corpo-
rate obligations are in dispute.
11
  This Article challenges these conten-
tions. 
Beginning from established theories of the firm, Part II extends 
standard views of corporate personhood to develop alternative theo-
ries of corporate groups.  Conceptions of the firm within the field of 
economics are invaluable in explaining the origins of corporate struc-
tures and, indeed, the evolution of corporate groups.
12
  However, not 
all legal rules, whether from a liability, regulatory, or governance 
standpoint, that fit the unitary corporate entity can be applied easily 
to the corporate group—as the proliferation of regulations directed 
at corporate groups attests.
13
  Acknowledging these differences as a 
matter of law requires perspectives of the corporate group that rec-
ognize their complex organizational structure and diversity as well as 
standards for identifying where, as a matter of legal doctrine, differ-
ences between the firm as a single entity and the firm as a complex 
organization matter.  Yet existing theories of corporate personhood 
have been articulated and interpreted largely at the level of a simple 
unitary organization.
14
 
Much of the attention directed toward corporate groups by cor-
porate law scholars has focused on veil piercing doctrine and the ap-
plication of limited liability at the enterprise level, within or across 
the corporate group.
15
  This Article does not challenge these princi-
ples.  Instead, it argues that alternative theories of the corporate 
 
 9 See, e.g., Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 
1259, 1271–74 (1982).  But see GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 29–32 (critiquing this 
view).   
 10 See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (surveying these regulations).   
 11 See infra notes 147–52 and accompanying text (introducing these views). 
 12 See sources cited supra note 3. 
 13 See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (surveying these regulations).   
 14 See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra Part II.C.1.  
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group may lead to different legal rules and case outcomes even if ex-
isting limited liability rules are assumed. 
This Article also responds to the broader critique that theories 
of corporate personhood are of little practical moment, whether 
from a positive or a normative standpoint.  In fact, in two successive 
terms, the Supreme Court has had opportunity to consider several 
cases where the courts’ (and legislatures’) understandings of the cor-
poration and of corporate groups played a foundational role.  Part II 
of this Article weighs the normative implications of theories of the 
corporate group and what they contribute to evolving conceptions of 
corporate accountability.  Part III of this Article then illustrates the 
utility of these theories by applying them in an analysis of the Su-
preme Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United v. FEC, decided in 
early 2010,
16
 Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, decided 
in June 2011,
17
 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., a case now 
pending before the Court.
18
  This analysis sheds light on some of the 
inconsistencies and weaknesses within these cases that closer atten-
tion to the corporate group might have clarified and suggests how al-
ternative theoretical perspectives of the corporate group matter to 
case outcomes. 
The evidence presented here from a range of doctrinal arenas 
confirms that no one theoretical approach is likely to be predictive of 
case outcomes, nor is there a single approach that offers the “best” 
normative guide for courts and regulators in all doctrinal domains.  
Accordingly, the argument made here is not for convergence in per-
spectives on corporate groups across all areas of the law.  Rather, it is 
that in different areas of the law, theories of the corporation, and, by 
extension, of corporate groups can be used to evaluate or legitimate 
particular legal rules.
19
  In this effort, the conception of corporate 
groups that is optimal (and indeed the normative goal defining what 
“optimal” means) must be determined in light of the policy objectives 
motivating that area of the law and the realities of corporate prac-
 
 16 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 17 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).   
 18 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. Oct. 17, 
2011) (No. 10-1491).  
 19 See generally Horwitz, supra note 1, at 176 (demonstrating the influence of legal 
theory on the evolution and legitimacy of legal rules that permitted the emergence 
of “big business”).  On the legitimating function of corporate theory, see also Millon, 
supra note 1, at 241−43 (critiquing Horwitz and noting that the relationship between 
legal theory and social practice is, in fact, interdependent, such that practice can also 
legitimate one theory over another).   
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tice.
20
  There is therefore an even greater need for an analysis of mul-
tiple perspectives since explicit recognition of the differences among 
potential approaches is the best route to greater predictability within 
discrete areas of the law. 
To guide such choices, Part IV proposes a preliminary frame-
work for identifying which approach offers the best foundation upon 
which alternative visions of the corporate group may lead to different 
legal rules or case outcomes.  This analysis emphasizes the ways in 
which conceptions of the personhood of the corporation and, by ex-
tension, of corporate groups, have direct bearing on critical policy 
choices regarding corporate rights and duties, power, and voice. 
II. FROM THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION TO THEORIES OF 
CORPORATE GROUPS 
One of the fundamental defining characteristics of the corpora-
tion is that it constitutes a separate legal person with rights and obli-
gations distinct from those of its owners.
21
  Although this basic propo-
sition is nearly universally recognized worldwide,
22
 considerable 
controversy, within which the Supreme Court has recently become 
embroiled, surrounds notions of corporate personhood. 
Rarely within this debate, however, have commentators consid-
ered how questions of corporate personhood play out in the context 
of the corporate group.  Despite the fact that many regulatory re-
gimes in the United States and elsewhere now approach the corpo-
 
 20 This conclusion is in line with earlier observations by Philip Blumberg.  See 
BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 120 (“Enterprise law . . . reflects very different considera-
tions as the nature of the fundamental jurisprudential problem before the court 
changes . . . . [A]nd it is foolish to expect that any consistent or transcendental body 
of jurisprudence will emerge.  The choice between enterprise principles and entity 
law will reflect the values and interests at stake and the fundamental nature of the 
[decision presented to] the court.”).   
 21 The defining features of the corporate form are legal personality, limited lia-
bility for owners and managers, shared ownership by investors of capital, delegation 
of management under a board structure, and transferability of shares.  Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
439–40 (2001); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 11 (“Sometimes it is 
said that the distinctive features of the corporation are limited liability, legal identity, 
and perpetual existence . . . .”). 
 22 See, e.g., DAVID MILMAN, NATIONAL CORPORATE LAW IN A GLOBALISED MARKET 60–
61 (2009) (“This is a sine qua non of any corporate law model.” (citing recognition of 
this principle by courts in both common and civil law jurisdictions, as well as by in-
ternational courts)); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 439–40 (observing 
that full legal personality is one of the “core functional features of [the corporate 
form that] were essentially identical” worldwide by the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry). 
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rate group as a single economic enterprise,
23
 the question of what the 
corporation actually “is” continues to be analyzed as if the typical 
business entity were a single closely held private corporation.  In ac-
tuality, of course, for decades the corporate group has been the pre-
dominant form of business organization for all but the smallest busi-
nesses.
24
  Most major public corporations are in fact part of corporate 
groups that contain hundreds or even thousands of affiliated compa-
nies around the world.
25
 
This Article takes these complex corporate organizations as its 
focus.  This Part first introduces the primary understandings of cor-
porate personhood that have been advanced over the past century 
and then extends them to corporate groups.  It begins by introducing 
some of the core concepts that are essential to the discussion. 
A. Defining the “Corporate Group” 
Defining the corporation itself is of course fairly simple—it is a 
legal entity possessing the characteristics defined by the corporate law 
of its state of incorporation, or if beyond the United States, by the law 
of the jurisdiction in which it is formed.
26
  Although what constituen-
cies together form the “corporation” is at times unclear, state corpo-
rate law, the terms of the corporate charter, and other contractual 
mechanisms establish the corporation as a separate legal person and 
delimit its formal boundaries. 
Defining the corporate group is a more complicated exercise.  
In Germany and France, the corporate group is a distinct entity form 
governed by its own body of law.
27
  In the United States, however, 
there is no entity form corresponding to the corporate group, nor is 
there a uniform definition.
28
  For convenience, academic commenta-
 
 23 See infra text accompanying notes 109−112. 
 24 David Sugarman, Corporate Groups in Europe: Governance, Industrial Organization, 
and Efficiency in a Post-Modern World, in REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE 13, 
20 (David Sugarman & Gunther Teubner eds., 1990). 
 25 For a more complete discussion of multinational enterprises, see infra Part 
III.C. 
 26 See supra note 21 (discussing these fundamental characteristics).  
 27 See DINE, supra note 2, at 57–59 (describing the German “Konzernrecht”); JOSÉ 
ENGRÁCIA ANTUNES ET AL., REPORT OF THE REFLECTION GROUP ON THE FUTURE OF EU 
COMPANY LAW 59 (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_rep
ort_en.pdf (surveying current practice within the European Union).  The European 
Commission is currently considering whether to adopt uniform rules for corporate 
groups.  See generally id. at 59–76.    
 28 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 24, at 25 (discussing the complexities surround-
ing this basic definitional issue).   
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tors and the courts use generic terms, such as the firm, the company, 
and even the corporation to refer to the corporate group. 
At the outset, any effort to define the corporate group must 
begin by acknowledging that both the “corporation” and the “corpo-
rate group” are “firms” in the Coasian sense.  That is, both are eco-
nomic organizations that emerge when organizing production inter-
nally is less costly than coordinating transactions through market ex-
exchange.
29
  In other words, the corporate form or “hierarchy” is an 
alternative to markets.
30
  The economic boundaries of the firm as an 
enterprise need not, and indeed, frequently do not, however, corre-
spond in any transparent way to its legal boundaries.
31
 
The key defining characteristic of a corporate group is typically 
common ownership.  The prototypical corporate group includes a 
parent company and its direct and indirect subsidiaries, each with a 
separate legal identity and its own legal rights and obligations.
32
  As-
sets of the corporate group may be held in trusts, special purpose ve-
hicles, and other separate legal entities owned by one or more mem-
bers of the corporate group.
33
  The corporate group may, and in fact 
 
 29 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (defin-
ing a firm as “the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direc-
tion of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur” rather than on the price mecha-
nism); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 8 (defining the “firm” simply 
as “an aggregation of people banded together for a longer period,” as compared to 
the short-term economic transactions that define a “market); SCOTT & DAVIS, supra 
note 4, at 221–25 (explaining transaction cost theory and the origin of firms); Har-
old Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141 (1988). 
 30 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (applying a transaction cost analysis to 
explain the emergence of organizational hierarchies as an alternative to markets). See 
also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975) (exploring the role of market failure in the rise of organization-
al hierarchy and of organizational failure in the assignment of economic activity to 
the market). 
 31 See generally Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal 
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007). 
 32 See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 247 (“[S]tock ownership or control is the 
wellspring of ‘control’ in corporate groups . . . .”); DINE, supra note 2, at 40.  This is 
the definition adopted by one of the few U.S. statutes that incorporates the term, 
“corporate group.”  See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c), (d)(1)–(2) (2011) (defining bank lend-
ing limits that apply to the “corporate group,” defined based on majority equity own-
ership by one entity of another, and distinguishing other “common enterprises,” 
which may arise, inter alia, if borrowers “are related directly or indirectly through 
common control” or are financially interdependent).   
 33 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2012) (defining assets of a “subsidiary” 
to include those of “any entity wholly-owned and controlled, directly or indirectly by 
the corporation, . . . [including] without limitation, corporations, partnerships, lim-
ited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, and/or 
statutory trusts”). 
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typically does, include limited liability companies (LLCs) and other 
entities that are not formally corporations.
34
  Corporate groups can 
therefore be seen as “hybrid arrangements between contract and or-
ganization,” having a “paradoxical character of multiplicity and uni-
ty.”
35
 
Common equity ownership is not the only way for firms to enjoy 
the benefits of cooperative economic activity.  As sociologists John 
Scott and Gerald Davis point out: “Between market (arm’s length ex-
change) and hierarchy (vertical integration) lie a range of alternative 
means of governing exchanges that may be less costly, including hier-
archical contracting . . . joint operating agreements, or other hybrid 
forms,”
36
 including franchisees, distributors, licensees, and other in-
dependent contractors.  Other common arrangements are “strategic 
alliances” or joint ventures between two otherwise independent com-
panies where no legal entity is jointly established and owned by the 
joint venturers.
37
  In areas of the law where equity ownership is a nec-
essary criterion, a number of these common contractual relationships 
may lie beyond the boundaries of the corporate group.  The contrac-
tual arrangement will generally itself indicate whether the parties’ ar-
rangement is intended to create joint rights and obligations or oth-
erwise fall within the bounds of the corporate group.  For example, 
McDonald’s franchisees are not part of the McDonald’s corporate 
group even though the franchisee has licensed rights to the McDon-
ald’s tradename, trademarks, and other intellectual property that 
constitute its brand and even though the franchisee is the face of the 
company to the public.
38
 
Common ownership more clearly defines where the corporate 
group begins, but the question of where the corporate group ends is 
another matter.  The answer has to do with the second and related 
 
 34 See id. 
 35 Gunther Teubner, Unitas Multiplex: Corporate Governance in Group Enterprises, in 
REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE, supra note 24, at 67. 
 36 SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 4, at 227;  see also John Scott, Corporate Groups and 
Network Structure, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING 
STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 291 (Joseph McCahery et al., eds., 
1995) (emphasizing the corporate group as network).  
 37 See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 62–64, 72–74.  In his survey of the law of 
corporate groups, Blumberg places contractual relationships beyond the boundaries 
of the corporate group.  BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 247.  
 38 See, e.g., See if You Have What It Takes: McDonald’s Franchising, MCDONALDS,  
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/franchising.html (reporting that “[m]ore 
than 80%” of McDonald’s franchises are owned and operated by the franchisees) 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2012).  McDonald’s instead refers to its franchisees as part of the 
McDonald’s “system.”  Id.  
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criterion for membership in the corporate group—control.  At its 
most basic, “control” is defined as the ownership of a majority voting 
interest of the corporation’s shares, which confers the power to select 
the board of directors,
39
 although control may also be conferred con-
tractually.
40
  Where the shareholder is another corporation, the de-
gree of control exercised by the parent depends primarily on the vot-
ing interest of the parent corporation in the subsidiary, which need 
not be identical to its financial stake.  Subsidiaries may be wholly or 
partially owned by their parent company, and the parent corporation 
may hold a percentage interest that is also sufficient to exercise indi-
rect control over subsidiaries further down in the corporate struc-
ture.
41
  Nonetheless, even where a parent corporation holds, directly 
or indirectly, only a minority interest, it may still have the ability to 
control the management of the subsidiary corporation through over-
lapping directorates, operational integration, or other means.
42
 
Many statutory regimes, including ERISA, follow the eighty per-
cent ownership threshold adopted under the Internal Revenue 
Code’s definition of a “controlled corporate group” as a bright line 
mathematical standard.
43
  Regulatory statutes often sweep broadly, 
encompassing the regulated entity and all others “that it controls, is 
controlled by, or is under common control with.”
44
  Because of the 
wide variation in control arrangements among firms, however, the 
tests developed in common law for establishing the presence of a 
“control” relationship are generally based on multiple factors.
45
  For 
example, in cases involving majority shareholder duties, the Delaware 
courts define “control” to include majority ownership of the corpora-
 
 39 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 
1994).  Share ownership generally carries with it the right to elect the company’s di-
rectors and vote on major transactions based on the percentage voting interest held.  
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212 (2012) (election of directors); id. § 
242(b) (charter amendments); id. § 251(c) (mergers); id. § 271(a) (asset sales). 
 40 See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 304–06, 343–44 (discussing the concept of con-
trol underling enterprise liability and noting that control can arise by share owner-
ship and by contract). 
 41 See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 65–73. 
 42 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Kiel, Kevin Hendry & Gavin J. Nicholson, Corporate Govern-
ance Options for the Local Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
INT’L REV. 568 (2006) (surveying various sources of subsidiary control).   
 43 Blumberg, supra note 2, at 306 (citing as an example, Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 26 U.S.C. § 1563(a)(1) (2006), which defines 
a “controlled group of corporations” with reference to the eighty percent standard).   
 44 See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 305 & n.22 (citing examples). 
 45 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12–13 (providing examples of 
this variability). 
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tion’s voting rights and/or the “actual control” of the business and 
affairs of the corporation.
46
  The latter inquiry is “highly contextual-
ized.”
47
  Relevant factors include the appointment by the parent cor-
poration of its own officers to the subsidiary’s board, the presence of 
external contracts or other business arrangements that facilitate the 
shareholder’s control, and a general alignment of interests among 
the corporate entities through which the ultimate parent may exer-
cise control.
48
  Similarly, in veil-piercing jurisprudence, functional 
control by a parent corporation over its subsidiary may be found 
based on the degree of economic, financial, personnel, and adminis-
trative integration within the group, as well as the use of a common 
public persona.
49
  Courts also look to similar factors in interpreting 
statutory definitions of “control.”
50
 
Without control, the corporation’s relationship to an entity 
whose shares it owns begins to resemble a pure investment relation-
ship.  Yet clear lines cannot always be drawn.  For example, which 
definition of “control” is relevant?  How much indirect control is suf-
ficient for the investee corporation to be deemed part of the corpo-
rate group?  Should the distinction be based on formal criteria, a 
more substantive inquiry, or both?
51
  At what point is control so at-
tenuated that the corporate shareholder should be considered a pas-
sive investor in an unrelated entity rather than a member of the same 
corporate group? 
A final factor that has guided courts in the veil-piercing context 
and in weighing these difficult questions is the consideration of 
whether related entities function as a single integrated enterprise.  
For example, in the famous case Walkovszky v. Carlton which involved 
claims against numerous New York taxi cab companies, the plaintiff 
sought to impose liability horizontally on ten separate corporations 
operating under common ownership and control on grounds that 
 
 46 E.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994). 
 47 See id. 
 48 Id. at 1114 (noting that potential to control is insufficient, but finding evidence 
of control where a parent corporation with a 43.3% minority share in its subsidiary 
had nonetheless exercised actual control over its subsidiary).   
 49 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 116 (noting that the concept of “control” in veil-
piercing cases has not necessarily been limited to a requirement of a majority or con-
trolling ownership interest).  For more on veil piercing, see infra Part II.C.1 and 
sources cited therein.   
 50 See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(observing that the interpretation of control under the Securities Act depends on the 
facts and circumstances of the relationship).  
 51 Some of these challenges are identified in Sugarman, supra note 24, at 25.   
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they constituted a single economic entity.
52
  Although the court in 
that case rejected plaintiff’s argument,
53
 economic and decisional in-
tegration remains relevant in determining whether independent enti-
ties should be viewed, as a matter of law, as a single integrated enter-
prise.
54
  Indeed, many courts often adopt an enterprise approach only 
when “control” is accompanied by evidence of financial, operational, 
or administrative integration.
55
 
Ultimately, the bounds of the corporate group must often be set 
within particular regulatory domains or by corporations themselves.  
Securities regulations and accounting standards give companies some 
flexibility in determining whether to include minority holdings with-
in the group for consolidated financial reporting purposes.
56
  Corpo-
rations can also, by charter or otherwise by contract, determine the 
threshold that constitutes “control” in order to delimit the bounds of 
the corporate group.
57
 
Figure 1 illustrates possible definitions of the corporate group, 
including contractual relationships.  The broadest definition of the 
group would reach to the upper left corner of Figure 1 and include 
even loose contractual “networks” of intercorporate relationships, 
such as global supply chains, in which ownership and control ele-
ments are lacking.
58
  Unless defined otherwise, the term “corporate 
group” is used in this Article to refer to the narrower conception rep-
 
 52 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966). 
 53 Id. at 10.   
 54 Labor, employment, and discrimination laws adopt a similar test to determine 
whether related entities constitute a single employer.  See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 
300, 307. 
 55 Id. at 300–01. 
 56 See Rule 3A-02(a) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3A-02 (2012) 
(“[C]onsolidated statements are [advisable under the regulations] when one entity 
directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest in another entity”).  Majority-
owned subsidiaries generally must be consolidated.  § 210.3A-02(a); Int’l Accounting 
Standards Bd., International Financial Reporting Standards, Standard 10, ¶ IN8 at 
A373–74 (2011) (effective Jan 1. 2013); id. ¶¶ 17–18, at A377 (“An investor controls 
an investee when the investor is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its 
involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect those returns through its 
power over the investee.”).  
 57 See, e.g., SPRINT NEXTEL CORP., AMENDED AND RESTATED ARTICLES OF 
INCORPORATION Sec. 9 (2005), available at 
http://www.sprint.com/governance/docs/SprintNextelArticles.pdf (defining con-
trol to include the power to vote more than thirty-five percent  of an entity’s stock or 
to “directly or indirectly . . . elect a majority of the board . . . or direct . . . the man-
agement and policies of . . . the entity”).  
 58 See supra note 36 and sources cited therein (introducing network theories of 
the corporation); see also, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2 (describing transnational 
network enterprises). 
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resented in the lower right corner of Figure 1—an economic organi-
zation or enterprise that is comprised of multiple legal entities linked 
by some degree of common ownership and control. 
 
Figure 1: Delimiting the Corporate Group 
 
  
B. Theories of Corporate Personhood 
Since the advent of the corporate form, the extent to which cor-
porations should bear the same rights and duties as individuals has 
engaged corporate law scholars and the courts.
59
  The long-standing 
debate surrounding the nature of corporate personhood has focused 
on three basic perspectives
60
: (i) the concession or “artificial entity” 
 
 59 See supra note 1.  The corporation is the most developed form of legal entity, 
but these perspectives can also be directly applied to other organizations, such as 
non-profits or labor unions, which use the corporate form.  Some aspects of the dis-
cussion that do not depend on limited liability may also apply to partnerships and 
other informal associations.  See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 210–11, 230 (exploring 
the extension of enterprise principles to non-corporate business associations); see also 
Laski, supra note 1 (exploring theories of entity personhood as applied to associa-
tions, including trade unions, trusts, and voluntary organizations); infra Part III.C 
(discussing Judge Posner’s analysis of the personhood of a limited liability company 
in the Flomo case).  
 60 There is voluminous literature surrounding these basic theories that cannot be 
fully captured in this abbreviated survey.  See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical 
Transformation of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 767 (2005); sources cited supra note 1.      
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theory, which sees the corporation as a creation of the state or sover-
eign that grants its charter;
61
 (ii) the aggregate theory, which sees the 
corporation as a fictional construct representing the sum of its share-
holders, managers, and other constituencies who contribute to the 
success of the corporate enterprise; and (iii) the real entity view, 
which sees the corporation, not as an extension of the state or of its 
many constituencies, but as having a separate identity independent of 
both.
62
 
Successive transformations of the corporate form have led to the 
somewhat cyclical ascendancy of one view over the other.
63
  Owing to 
the heritage of English corporate law, the corporation has been rec-
ognized throughout the history of the United States as a legal person 
that enjoys certain rights and obligations independent of its share-
holders.
64
  As explored further in Part IV, the contested issues center 
instead on which rights and duties must be reserved for natural per-
sons and the rationale for such distinctions.  Theories of the corpora-
tion speak particularly to these underlying justifications. 
The concession theory most accurately reflects the historical ori-
gins of the corporation and was the predominant view in the United 
States until the late nineteenth century.
65
  This understanding was 
perhaps most famously articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Trus-
tees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: “A corporation is an artificial be-
ing, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
law. . . .  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those prop-
erties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.” 
66
  Any act of 
the corporation beyond the permitted scope contained in its charter 
 
 61 This conception is also referred to as the “grant” theory.  See, e.g., Ron Harris, 
The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From German 
Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1421, 1424 (2006).   
 62 Some scholars refer to the “real entity” view as the “natural entity theory,” 
while others distinguish the two.  See, e.g., id.; Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real 
Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1067–68 (1994) (referring 
to the two synonymously).   
 63 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60 (tracing the evolution of the corporation through 
four evolutionary phases); see also Millon, supra note 1, at 205–40.  There is some de-
bate over the causal relationship between the emergence of these theories and 
changes in corporate law and practice.  See, e.g. Millon, supra note 1, at 240–51; Law-
rence E. Mitchell, The Relevance of Corporate Theory to Corporate and Economic Develop-
ment: Comment on the Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theo-
ries, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1489 (2006). 
 64 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, at 785–86. 
 65 Id.; see Millon, supra note 1, at 205–11. 
 66 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).  The Court in Dartmouth College also drew 
on elements of an aggregate theory.  See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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was “beyond the power” of the corporation or “ultra vires.”  The ultra 
vires restriction limited not only the corporation’s scope of opera-
tion, but its economic power and influence in society as well.
67
  Be-
cause the corporation’s authority was derived from the state, many 
early charters were granted to corporations to enable them to ad-
vance public purposes rather than strictly profit-making objectives, 
although commercial ventures also proliferated.
68
 
By the late 1800s, New Jersey, and later other states, began to 
enact general incorporation statutes that facilitated the growth of for-
profit corporations.
69
  In time, the removal of many of the public wel-
fare limits from state corporate codes and the ultimate decline of the 
ultra vires doctrine rendered the concession view largely obsolete. 
70
 
A new vision of the corporation that emerged during the early 
twentieth century was the aggregate view, which emphasized the ob-
jectives and interests of the individuals who formed the corporation.
71
  
This approach was a natural outgrowth of the emphasis on freedom 
of contract presumed by the incorporation statutes and was also in-
spired by massive changes in the economy.  The end of the nine-
teenth century was a time when the growth of large-scale ventures, 
such as railroads, steel and oil companies, that required capital from 
a broad base of investors was revolutionizing the scale of American 
business.  The aggregate view therefore resonated with a growing 
sense that economic activity was private activity that should be free 
from interference by the state, with market forces and private con-
tracting, not state fiat, defining the corporate form.
72
 
Like the aggregate view, the “real entity” view developed in re-
sponse to the decline of state chartering, as corporate activity came to 
be seen as private rather than public, and corporate persons came to 
be viewed as sharing many of the rights and obligations of natural 
 
 67 GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 77 n.20 (citing Justice Brandeis’ commentary on 
the doctrine). 
 68 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, and sources cited therein; see also Millon, supra 
note 1, at 210–13. 
 69 Millon, supra note 1, at 210–13. 
 70 For more on this history, see, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1491–93; see also 
Millon, supra note 1, at 212 (tracing the decline of the ultra vires doctrine to the 
1920s and perhaps as early as 1898).  The ultra vires doctrine is now quite limited in 
scope if not actually defunct.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 124 (2011).  But see 
GREENFIELD, supra note 7, at 73–105 (calling for its revival as a restraint on violations 
of law by corporations).   
 71 See Millon, supra note 1, at 212–15, 220–24.  For more on this history, see Avi-
Yonah, supra note 60, at 1012 and sources cited therein. 
 72 See Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24.  For more on this history, see Avi-Yonah, 
supra note 60, at 1012 and sources cited therein. 
HARPER-HO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/24/2012  12:07 PM 
894 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:879 
persons.
73
  In contrast to the aggregate view, however, the “real entity” 
view posits that the corporation’s separate legal personality as a mat-
ter of formal structure in fact represents a separate identity that is 
more than the sum of the constituencies which contribute to its op-
erations.
74
  This view was recognized by the courts in the early 1800s 
and came into its own in the early twentieth century when the Berle-
Means firm, characterized by a large body of dispersed shareholders 
and a concomitant separation of ownership and control, became 
commonplace across the economy.
75
 
Although much early case law and commentary during this peri-
od endorsed an aggregate view, with its emphasis on shareholder in-
terests and property rights in the corporation, the new organizational 
reality could no longer be squared with the partnership conceptions 
that had grounded the aggregate view.
76
  As a result, the real entity 
view prevailed during the early decades of the 1900s.
77
 
In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their semi-
nal work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which reinvigor-
ated the aggregate theory of the corporation and laid the foundation 
for conceptions of shareholder primacy that continue to dominate 
academic and popular understandings of corporate law.
78
  They de-
scribed the transformation of the corporate form in terms of the 
agency problems created by the separation of ownership and control, 
which, they suggested, could best be resolved by charging managers 
to serve as trustees for shareholders.
79
  As David Millon observes, by 
focusing on shareholder property rights, “Berle and Means effectively 
disregarded notions of the corporate entity and peered directly into 
the corporate enterprise, focusing their attention on . . . the . . . 
shareholders and the professional managers” charged with steward-
 
 73 Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24.  
 74 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 60, at 1012; Millon, supra note 1, at 213–20. 
 75 For a thorough discussion of the early caselaw and this history, see Millon, su-
pra note 1, at 205–40; supra note 60.  Most scholars trace the real entity view’s roots to 
the early 1900s.  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 61, at 1472–73.   
 76 See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 181–82 (discussing the partnership roots of the 
corporate form); Millon, supra note 1, at 214 (“[D]evelopments in the internal rela-
tionship between management and shareholders rendered the partnership analogy 
untenable.”); see also Celia Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine, 85 OR. L. 
REV. 993, 1000 (2006). 
 77 Millon, supra note 1, at 214. 
 78 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 312–13 (rev. ed. 1968). 
 79 Id.; see also Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931). 
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ship of their investments.
80
  In other words, Berle and Means’ work 
rests implicitly on a view of the corporation as “an aggregation com-
posed of shareholders and management, the latter confined to labor 
for the interests of shareholders.”
81
 
Since the rise of the law and economics movement, dominant 
thinking about the nature of the corporation has coalesced around 
an aggregate theory of the corporation that sees the corporation as a 
“nexus of contracts.”
82
  Under a contractarian approach, the corpora-
tion has no separate identity of its own, but is an artificial construct 
representing the sum of the various contracts between shareholders, 
managers, creditors, and other resource providers, who explicitly or 
implicitly negotiate the terms of their participation in the corporate 
enterprise.
83
 Initially, the nexus of contracts approach focused pri-
marily on shareholders’ interests and their role as monitors and en-
forcers of the corporate contract.
84
  Later scholars, however, expand-
ed the constituencies whose contracts “mattered” to include 
employees, customers, and other stakeholders.  A prominent exam-
ple of the latter view is the team production theory of the firm ad-
vanced by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.
85
 
The real entity view has fallen out of favor among corporate law 
scholars as an improper reification of the corporate form.
86
  Nonethe-
 
 80 Millon, supra note 1, at 222. 
 81 Id. at 222–23.  For more on the link between Berle and Means’ work and 
shareholder primacy, see id. 
 82 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 
858–60 (1996) (quoting then-Chancellor Allen’s observation that the contractarian 
view is now the “dominant legal academic view” (internal quotations and citation 
omitted)).  The seminal literature grounding this view include the work of 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12  (explaining the basis of the “nexus of 
contracts” understanding of the firm); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (argu-
ing that information costs explain the rise of firms); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4 
(articulating the nexus of contracts model of the corporation); Frank H. Easterbrook 
& Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) 
(same).   
 83 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4.  
 84 See Millon, supra note 1, at 220–24; Phillips, supra note 62, at 1066, 1072–73. 
 85 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999). 
 86 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 12 (“The ‘personhood’ of a 
corporation is a matter of convenience rather than reality.”); Thomas A. Smith, The 
Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 214, 214 (1999) (“To economically oriented corporate law professors, distin-
guishing between directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corpora-
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less, the legacy of the real entity view remains today in modern cor-
porate codes and common law doctrines—most notably the business 
judgment rule—that give directors discretion to act independently of 
the will of the shareholders.
87
  Statutory arenas ranging from criminal 
law,
88
 to securities regulation,
89
 to antitrust,
90
 as well as certain areas of 
constitutional law,
91
 also reflect the view that the rights and duties of 
the corporate entity are distinct from those of the corporation’s of-
ficers, directors, and other constituents. 
The real entity approach also finds support beyond the legal 
academy among scholars of organizational culture and management.  
They observe that within single corporate entities as well as within 
corporate groups, collective identity emerges from the inter-
relationships of individuals and coalitions that constitute the organi-
zation as a whole.
 
 Although these identities may be shaped by senior 
management, they cannot be identified with a single individual or 
leadership structure.
92
  The view that a corporation possesses its own 
 
tion itself smacks of reification—treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a 
real thing.”).  
 87 Ultimate oversight authority rests with the board, which must act in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders.  See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 141(a) 
(2011); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).  See generally Stephen Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 576 
(2003) (identifying sources of director discretion); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened 
Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 59, 73–76 (2010) (surveying the literature on the directory primacy model 
of corporate governance).   
 88 For more on corporate criminal liability, see John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to 
Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981) (arguing that criminal penalties for the corpora-
tion should not be displaced by sanctions on individual corporate decision-makers); 
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1477, 1488–91 (1996) (observing that other legal systems outside the Anglo-
American sphere are increasingly receptive to the concept of corporate criminal lia-
bility).   
 89 For more on the consolidation of corporate group affiliates for reporting pur-
poses under the securities laws, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 90 The Supreme Court has held that parents and their wholly owned subsidiaries 
must be treated as one entity under the Sherman Act on grounds that they cannot 
“agree” and therefore be deemed to form a “combination” or “conspiracy.”  
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 772 (1984).   
 91 For a discussion on constitutional law, see infra Part III.A. (summarizing these 
cases).  
 92 See, e.g., HOWARD E. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 2–8 (1999) (defining 
organizations as the collective product of individual interactions, that is “socially con-
structed systems of human activity”) (citations omitted); Suzana B. Rodrigues & John 
Child, The Development of Corporate Identity: A Political Perspective, 45 J. MGMT. STUDIES 
885 (2008); Said Elbanna & John Child, The Influence of Decision, Environmental and 
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“culture” or “identity” was also implicitly accepted by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in its landmark case, Paramount Communications v. 
Time, Inc., and from a historical standpoint has demonstrated re-
markable staying power.
93
 
C. Theories of the Corporate Group and Dimensions of Analysis 
In part because the emergence of corporate groups is largely a 
twentieth century phenomenon, the theories introduced in Part II.B 
above have generally been articulated in terms of a single corporate 
entity and the real people behind it.  For example, Dartmouth College is 
typically cited as the quintessential expression of the concession view, 
but it rests simultaneously on the associational interests of the indi-
viduals behind it: “By [the corporate form], a perpetual succession of 
individuals are capable of acting . . . like one immortal being.”
94
   
Similarly, early cases adopting an aggregate approach emphasize 
the interests of the firm’s individual shareholders, employees, and 
managers.  One example is the California Circuit Court’s opinion in 
the City of Santa Clara v. South Pacific Railroad Co., later affirmed sum-
marily by the Supreme Court, which recognized that corporations are 
“persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
95
  There, Justice Field stated: “[P]rivate cor-
porations consist of an association of individuals. . . .  The courts will 
always look through the [corporate] name to see and protect those 
whom the name represents.”
96
  Even though the aggregate theory as 
 
Firm Characteristics on the Rationality of Strategic Decision-Making,  44 J. MGMT. STUDIES 
561 (2007); Scott, supra note 36 (analyzing the nature of corporate groups).  
 93 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del. 1990) (permitting Time’s board of directors to 
accept a lower offer for its stock given their view that an acquisition by Paramount 
would threaten Time’s corporate culture).  Unfortunately, the court in Paramount 
did not provide any analysis of the implications of that claim for understandings of 
the corporation or corporate groups.   
 94 Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) 
(Story, J., concurring) (emphasis added).   
[A]n aggregate corporation at common law is a collection of indi-
viduals, united into one collective body, under a special name. . . . 
I t  possesses the capacity . . . of suing and being sued . . . .  [It] is, in 
short, an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and en-
dowed with certain powers and franchises which, though they must 
be exercised through the medium of its natural members, are yet con-
sidered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were 
a real personage. 
Id. at 667 (Story, J., concurring).   
 95 18 F. 385, 402–03 (D. Cal. 1883), aff’d sub nom. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. 
Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).   
 96 Id.; see Horwitz, supra note 1, at 177–78 (discussing the companion circuit court 
cases).   
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seen through the lens of modern economics has long recognized that 
a corporation’s shareholders, creditors, and other constituents might 
themselves be corporations, standard conceptions of the corporation 
in the caselaw and in the literature still fail to make any distinction 
between their application to single corporations and to complex cor-
porate groups.
97
  With the exception of the parent corporation as 
shareholder, juridical persons within the corporate group are ig-
nored.  The same can be said for articulations of the real entity theo-
ry.
98
   
To understand the nature of the corporate group, however, a se-
cond dimension is needed.  This dimension is best captured by two 
competing approaches: the enterprise view and the entity view.  An 
enterprise approach views all of the legal entities that comprise the 
corporate group as part of a single economic organization, while the 
entity view emphasizes the separate legal identity of the affiliates that 
together form the corporate group.
99
  Because much of the analysis of 
the enterprise-entity distinction has been directed at allocating liabil-
ity among related entities in a corporate group, this discussion intro-
duces these concepts first in that context before presenting a more 
nuanced view of the corporate group that builds on these categories. 
1. Limited Liability & the Corporate Group 
Historically, the enterprise and entity views have been articulat-
ed as competing theories of liability within tort law and various statu-
tory regimes.  In corporate law, they emerge primarily in veil-piercing 
jurisprudence.
100
  Part of the tension between the enterprise and the 
entity approach, as well as the courts’ general hesitation to impose 
enterprise liability,
101
 can be explained in part by the complex nature 
of the corporate group itself. 
 
 97 See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 275, 278 (describing the Team Produc-
tion Theory of the corporation as one in which “a number of individuals come to-
gether to undertake a team production project that requires all to make some form 
of enterprise-specific investment” and noting that “a public corporation is a team of 
people”); see also Part III.A. (citing examples from Citizens United v. FEC). 
 98  See discussion infra notes 184–219 and accompanying text.   
 99 This distinction was first articulated by Phillip Blumberg.  See  BLUMBERG, supra 
note 2, at 65, 89–90. 
 100 For a survey of veil-piercing doctrine and practice, see Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing 
the Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 637 n.1 (2005) (listing sources); 
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1036, 1036 (1991); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Cor-
porate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 379 (1999). 
 101 See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text. 
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The fundamental principle that each corporation enjoys a sepa-
rate legal personality with rights and obligations distinct from those 
of its owners, when combined with the grant of limited liability and 
the ability of one corporation to own shares in another, makes possi-
ble the formation of corporate groups.
102
  Because each company 
within the corporate group is a distinct legal entity, corporations can 
structure their subsidiaries and allocate their assets so as to reduce 
the parent company’s (and the group’s) exposure to liability as well 
as to shield subsidiaries from risk created by other affiliates’ opera-
tions.
103
  Limited liability within the corporate group also reduces 
monitoring costs and permits diversification of business operations 
across multiple jurisdictions and (in the case of conglomerates, across 
multiple industries) to an extent that would be impossible were the 
corporate form routinely disregarded within the corporate group.
104
  
Limited liability is therefore key to the corporate group’s efficiency as 
an economic organization.
105
 
Limited liability is also a risk allocation device.
106
  In particular, 
limited liability within the corporate group also allows corporations 
to shift costs to creditors when compensation cannot be obtained 
from the corporate group of which the defaulting entity or tortfeasor 
is a part.
107
  As many commentators have noted, this raises particularly 
serious concerns with respect to tort claimants, who cannot contrac-
tually protect themselves against such risks.
108
 
 
 102 See infra note 116 and accompanying text.   
 103 See MILMAN, supra note 22, at 62–63.   
 104 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 40–62 (summarizing the basic ra-
tionales for limited liability); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 479 (2001).  To be sure, the benefits of reduced monitoring and other 
agency costs are less relevant where there is no separation of ownership and control, 
which is the case both for close corporations and for corporate groups with wholly or 
majority owned subsidiaries.  See David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Re-
sponsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1314–17 (2007) (ob-
serving that efficiency rationales do not apply equally to firms with different owner-
ship structures)  
 105 See generally, WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (explaining internal markets within cor-
porate groups). 
 106 Millon argues in fact that the real policy justifications for limited liability are its 
risk-shifting function rather than the standard efficiency rationales.  See Millon, supra 
note 104, at 1317–25.  
 107 Limited liability is often contractually waived within the corporate group.  See, 
e.g., Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 
(2011) (describing the role of intragroup guarantees as a type of shareholder oppor-
tunism). 
 108 Some have advocated unlimited liability within corporate groups, at least for 
entities within the same industry.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1881 n.4 
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Imposing obligations, and therefore the potential for liability, on 
the corporate group, or on a parent corporation as a proxy for the 
group as a whole, however, is problematic because it compels the 
courts to disregard the formal legal identity of the individual compa-
nies comprising the group.  If applied broadly or unpredictably, this 
approach would threaten the very existence of corporate groups.  
When the separation between the corporation and its shareholders 
produces anomalous or inequitable results, courts have elected to 
“pierce the corporate veil” vertically or extend enterprise-wide liabil-
ity horizontally, but only in exceptional circumstances.
109
 
Beyond veil-piercing doctrine, however, U.S. law has recognized 
enterprise principles in a broad range of areas, including judicial 
procedure, bankruptcy, and statutes of general and specific applica-
tion to corporate groups.
110
  For example, enterprise principles have 
been widely adopted for decades under such diverse statutory re-
gimes as environmental law, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act’s anti-
bribery rules, antitrust, securities regulation, labor and employment 
laws, and corporate tax law.
111
  Some of these regulations have explicit 
extraterritorial effect.
112
 
 
(1991); Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002).  But see Bainbridge, supra note 104.  For a 
summary of this debate, see Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1417, 1417–29 (2010). 
 109 See Bainbridge, supra note 104, at 506–14 (surveying veil-piercing standards); 
see also supra note 100 and sources cited therein.  
 110 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 96–97, 116–20 (summarizing the “unitary tax cas-
es”).  For more on recognition of enterprise principles in cross-border insolvencies 
and in substantive consolidation doctrine, see Harry Rajak, Corporate Groups and Cross-
Border Bankruptcy, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 521 (2009); William H. Widen, Corporate Form and 
Substantive Consolidation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 237 (2007). 
 111 See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 307–26.  Blumberg divides statutory regimes into 
those of (i) “general application,” such as antitrust and trade regulation, labor, envi-
ronmental, and intellectual property laws, that do not explicitly reference corporate 
groups, and (ii) statutes of “specific application” to corporate groups, like the Bank, 
Savings and Loan, and Public Utility Holding Company Acts, which are designed 
specifically to regulate corporate groups on an enterprise-wide basis.  BLUMBERG, su-
pra note 2, at 101.  In the environmental arena, the Supreme Court has retreated 
from the enterprise theories of liability observed by Blumberg.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 67–70 (1998) (holding that a parent corporation could not 
be liable for violations of CERCLA by its subsidiary solely by virtue of its ownership 
interest and majority control of the subsidiary board).  
 112 See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2278 (2006) (munitions export con-
trols); Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–774 (2012); see also Jef-
frey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010) (surveying the doctrine governing 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law).  Some statutory regimes previously under-
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Under common law, then, enterprise liability is acknowledged 
only in exceptional cases, while its application within statutory re-
gimes has expanded over time.  Despite the acceptance of enterprise 
principles in many areas of the law, Professor Blumberg—whose writ-
ings form the foundation of legal scholarship on corporate groups—
concludes, based on a comprehensive survey across different areas of 
the law, that “enterprise law is not transcendental.  It is applied only 
in selected areas of the law where it more effectively implements the 
underlying purposes and objectives of the law.  In other respects, en-
tity law continues unaffected.”
113
 
2. Extending Theories of Corporate Personhood to the 
Corporate Group 
Because limited liability is essential to the existence of corporate 
groups, this Article does not argue for its elimination.  Although oth-
ers have made a convincing case for this within the bounds of the 
corporate group,
114
 the remainder of this Article assumes no altera-
tion in the scope of current limited liability rules.  Instead, this Article 
considers how analyses of corporate identity might be applied to the 
corporate group. 
As a starting point, consider first how the three traditional ap-
proaches to corporate identity intersect with the enterprise-entity dis-
tinction.  Figure 2 illustrates how the conceptions of corporate identi-
ty that have been introduced here with respect to single firms (the 
entity approach) can be easily extended to corporate groups (the en-
terprise approach) simply by shifting the level of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
stood to have extraterritorial effect have been limited by the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  See, e.g., 
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding 
that the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) does not 
apply extraterritorially post-Morrison). 
 113 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 230.  
 114 See discussion supra note 108. 
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Figure 2: Theories of Corporate Personhood in Two Dimensions 
 
 Entity  
(single corporation) 
Enterprise  
(corporate group) 
Concession  
Theory 
Corporations  
chartered by the state or  
sovereign. 
Corporate groups chartered 
by a national or transnation-
al chartering authority. 
 
Aggregate  
Theory  
The corporation is a fictional 
construct  
representing the sum of its 
constituencies. 
The corporate group is a 
fictional construct represent-
ing the sum of its affiliates 
and their constituencies. 
 
Real Entity  
Theory 
The corporation has a sepa-
rate identity  
greater than the sum of its 
constituencies. 
The corporate group has a 
separate identity greater 
than the sum of its affiliates 
and their constituencies. 
 
 
i. A Concession Theory of the Corporate Group 
During the period when corporations were created by grant of 
the state, chartering authorities did not authorize corporations to in-
clude in their approved purposes holding shares of other corpora-
tions.
115
  The formation of the corporate group became possible in 
the United States only in 1888 when New Jersey first permitted one 
corporation to become a shareholder of another.
116
  Accordingly, the 
corporate group was not initially associated with the concession or 
grant model, even though states continued to charter corporations 
well into the early 1900s.
117
  
Were the concession theory of the corporate group (shown in 
the upper right of Figure 2) to be revived for the modern corporate 
group, the corporate group would itself need to be created by grant 
from the state.
118
  Since today’s corporate groups extend beyond na-
tional boundaries, this approach would have practical meaning for 
many companies only in the unlikely event that a transnational legal 
 
 115 See BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 52–58. 
 116 Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, 1 1888 N.J. Laws 385.   
 117 See Taylor, supra note 76, at 998–1001.  
 118 Here, the term “state” refers to the source of chartering authority in a given 
jurisdiction, which could be at the supranational, national, or sub-national level.  
State-owned enterprises in Europe and in Asia are perhaps the closest modern ex-
ample of corporate groups that operate under a quasi-concession model, although in 
the standard concession theory, the state holds no ownership stake.   
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order emerges with the authority to charter transnational corpora-
tions. The company law harmonization project of the European Un-
ion, the introduction of the European company as a separate entity 
form, and the creation of pan-European Works Councils suggest a 
model for such an approach, and scholars have begun to consider the 
potential for similar developments to emerge globally.
119
  However, 
because this Article is focused on the import of these theories for 
U.S. law, the remainder of this discussion will consider only the “ag-
gregate enterprise” and “real enterprise” theories. 
ii. An Aggregate Enterprise Theory of the Corporate 
Group 
If at the level of the corporation, the aggregate approach em-
phasizes the interests of the shareholders or other constituencies that 
form the corporation, then an “aggregate enterprise” approach to 
the corporate group must focus its analysis on the discrete business 
entities that constitute it and might reject any separate identity for 
the corporate group itself.  Oliver Williamson’s work provides a theo-
retical grounding for an application of aggregate theories to the cor-
porate group.  Williamson and others extended transaction cost the-
ories of the firm to explain the corporate group as a larger system of 
explicit and implicit contracts among the members of the corporate 
group who provide resources within the corporate enterprise as a 
whole.
120
  As German legal scholar and sociologist Gunther Teubner 
notes, “This approach allows the organized firm to be seen within a 
spectrum of various types of contractual relationships, from the spot-
market transaction up to the multinational group,” each with varying 
governance structures.”
121
 
In other words, because both a single corporation, such as Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., and the entire corporate group popularly known as 
“Wal-Mart” are firms, they can both be viewed as a fictional nexus of 
 
 119 See MILMAN, supra note 22, at 15–20 (surveying various harmonization efforts in 
Europe, Africa, and via the model law projects of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)); see also Larry Cata Backer, From Moral Obliga-
tion to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational 
Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591 (2008) (proposing international law as a source 
of regulation for global corporate groups); Robin F. Hansen, The International Legal 
Personality of Multinational Enterprises: Treaty, Custom and the Governance Gap, 10 GLOB. 
JURIST 1 (2010) (advances same).  At present, territorial sovereignty prevents any 
state from authorizing or chartering an entity outside its borders.   
 120 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 3; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 
12–13 (describing the range of organizational forms adopted by corporate groups to 
illustrate the contractual nature of the corporate form).   
 121 See Teubner, supra note 35, at 70. 
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the contracts that create them.  More specifically, an “aggregate en-
terprise” theory of the corporate group conceives of an entire eco-
nomic enterprise, such as “Wal-Mart,” not simply as Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., the parent company of the Wal-Mart group, but as the complex 
aggregation of the relationships among the legal entities that com-
prise the Wal-Mart corporate group globally. 
Under this vision, the relevant contracts are those between the 
corporate group and its shareholders, though precisely which share-
holders’ interests should matter is unclear: Is it the  parent’s inter-
ests?  The affiliates’ interests?  The minority shareholders’ interests?  
A broader alternative view is possible.  Under the latter, the relevant 
contracts might include contracts among the entities that comprise 
the group and all affiliates’ contracts with their respective constituen-
cies—a potentially unlimited set. 
Regardless of how this choice is made, the aggregate enterprise 
view, as a practical matter, implies two potential sets of legal rules.  
The first is the functional equivalent of a first-dimension entity ap-
proach.  Under this “pure aggregate” approach, the group itself 
would be completely disregarded, and legal rules would only apply to 
the individual firms that make up the corporate group.  Because this 
approach silos each entity within the corporate group, it would effec-
tively ignore the network of relationships between and among corpo-
rate group affiliates that define the group’s internal organizational 
and management structure and ultimately the corporate group itself.  
The only exception might be perhaps, direct parent-subsidiary rela-
tionships, which should be taken into account because the immediate 
parent corporation is a shareholder whose interests define the inter-
ests of its subsidiary.  There is, however, little practical benefit to such 
an approach, since it implies no change to simple entity-based rules. 
The pure aggregate approach is also unworkable in practice be-
cause in deciding cases involving entities with common ownership 
and control, courts cannot completely disregard the relationships be-
tween corporate affiliates and the existence of the larger corporate 
group.  Instead, they are called upon to interpret the explicit and 
implicit contracts within the group and between members of the 
group and third parties.  For example, the common law of fiduciary 
duties for majority shareholders has developed in recognition of the 
potential conflicts of interest that arise because of the control parent 
corporations exercise over their subsidiaries.  Yet such conflicts do 
not exist if the reality of the group itself is not acknowledged.  Simi-
larly, agency problems within the corporate group cannot be under-
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stood without consideration of the existence of the group as an or-
ganization.
122
 
Therefore, just as the corporation as a fictional nexus of con-
tracts is reconciled with an understanding that corporations are jurid-
ical entities with rights and duties independent of their shareholders, 
so an aggregate enterprise theory must mean that the corporate 
group is a fictional aggregate wherein legal rules may apply to the 
corporate group on an enterprise-wide basis even though the group 
itself has no independent identity.  For example, it may be more effi-
cient within securities or tax law to regulate related entities collective-
ly by means of this fictional construct on a consolidated or enterprise 
basis even if there is no actual reality or legal entity that may be iden-
tified as the corporate group.  This is in fact the standard 
contractarian approach to the corporate group as a firm and the only 
coherent way in which enterprise principles might properly be ex-
tended to it consistent with an aggregate theory.
123
  It is also the 
meaning intended by references to the “aggregate enterprise” ap-
proach in the remainder of this Article. 
There are, however, a number of limitations to an aggregate vi-
sion of the corporate group, particularly when applied to modern 
corporate groups that function on a globally integrated basis.
124
  First, 
since U.S. law does not recognize the corporate group as an inde-
pendent legal entity, the practical application of this approach re-
quires a designated entity within the corporate group, such as its ul-
timate parent or headquarters, to represent the consolidated group 
for purposes of regulatory compliance.
125
  This system of unitary at-
tribution is at odds with the decentralized and multi-centric decision-
making structures now common among many corporate groups.
126
 
 
 122 See, e.g., Bongjin Kim, John E. Prescott, & Sung Min Kim, Differentiated Govern-
ance of Foreign Subsidiaries in Transnational Corporations: An Agency Theory Perspective, 11 
J. INT’L MGMT. 43 (2005) (discussing strategies used to address these internal con-
flicts). 
 123 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 3 (applying relational contracting theory to explain 
the emergence of modern corporate groups). 
 124 See generally, Samuel J. Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, 85 FOREIGN 
AFF. 127 (2006) (describing the shift from the “multinational corporation” to the 
“globally integrated enterprise”).   
 125 For purposes of the securities laws, for example, the “representative” of the 
consolidated entity will be the registrant or issuer, and for tax purposes, the entity is 
the U.S. “citizen” or taxpayer.  These need not be synonymous with the ultimate par-
ent or headquarters of a global corporate group.   
 126 See, e.g., Julian M. Birkenshaw & Allen J. Morrison, Configurations of Strategy & 
Structure in Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 729 (1995) 
(analyzing “hierarchical” and “heterarchical” governance models); Yves Doz & C.K. 
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More fundamentally, notions of freedom of contract on which 
an aggregate enterprise view must be premised disregard the ability 
of the corporate group’s parent or controlling affiliate to unilaterally 
expand or contract the group (e.g., by forming or dissolving existing 
entities) to accomplish the group’s strategic goals. 
127
  In addition, as 
Teubner notes, 
The dissolution of economic organizations into a complex con-
tractual nexus [of affiliates] makes sense only with respect to 
member recruitment and the utilization of individual motivation 
for the purposes of the organization.  But as soon as the contrac-
tual mechanism becomes [reduced to exchange relationships 
among resource holders]. . . .  Cooperative and collective aspects 
of the organization are systematically ignored.
128
 
iii. A Real Enterprise Theory of the Corporate Group 
An alternative approach is to view the corporate group as a “real 
enterprise.”  As with other theories of the corporation, references in 
case law and academic articles to the rights or obligations of the cor-
poration or to the real entity view of the corporation tend to do so 
without explaining how the concepts of identity associated with the 
corporation as a legal entity might apply, if at all, to the corporate 
group.
129
  Extending the real entity view to the corporate group nec-
essarily implies that the group itself has an identity independent from 
that of its constituent firms.  This collective identity must also be dis-
tinct from that of the individual directors, officers, employees, and 
 
Prahalad, Patterns of Strategic Control Within Multinational Corporations, 15 J. BUS. STUD. 
55 (1984) (analyzing the managerial challenge of balancing responsiveness of subsid-
iaries to local conditions and the need for global strategic integration); Morten Huse 
& Violina P. Rindova, Stakeholders’ Expectations of Board Roles: The Case of Subsidiary 
Boards, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 153, 157–58, 171 (2001) (surveying the literature 
on subsidiary board function); Palmisano, supra note 124, at 134.  But see Geoffrey C. 
Kiel, Kevin Hendry & Gavin J. Nicholson, Corporate Governance Options for the Local 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 568 (2006) 
(noting the perfunctory role of many multinational subsidiary boards).  
 127 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 14; see also id. and sources cit-
ed therein (surveying the literature on the relationship between multinational man-
agement strategy and corporate group structure).  
 128 Teubner, supra note 35 at 71.  Teubner identifies several limits of contractually 
based theories of the group, including the following: i) its emphasis on competition 
among “resource holders” within the group ignores cooperative aspects that create 
efficiency advantages, ii) the organization’s members are subject to organizational 
norms and further its goals, iii) the contractual network is formed organically 
through evolutionary rather than market mechanisms, iv) transactions within the or-
ganization are decisions, not economic exchanges, and v) “the corporate interest is 
“an independent criterion in resolving conflicts among resource holders.”  Id. at 73. 
 129 See, e.g., disucssion infra Part III. 
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other agents through whom the parent, headquarters, or any other 
entity comprising the corporate group may act.  From this perspec-
tive, for example, “Wal-Mart” is an ontological construct more akin to 
the embodiment of the Wal-Mart brand than an extension of the 
Walton family, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., or its CEO.  In contrast to the 
aggregate enterprise view, a real enterprise approach acknowledges 
the possibility for the corporate group itself to bear independent 
rights and duties apart from those of its constituent firms.  This con-
cept is recognized to a limited extent in cases extending enterprise 
liability horizontally across a corporate group.
130
 
The real enterprise approach more closely meshes as a descrip-
tive matter with the economic realities of corporate groups.  Many 
multinational enterprises, in particular, utilize internal financing, 
management, and resource allocation mechanisms that extend across 
and integrate the entire enterprise.
131
  This view also offers the best fit 
with research on organizational and corporate identity finding the 
dynamic interactions among senior managers and even key employ-
ees across separate divisions and affiliates within a corporate group 
can together produce an independent corporate identity or cul-
ture.
132
 
However, like the aggregate enterprise approach, adopting a 
unitary view of the corporate group in practical terms requires the 
rights and duties of the corporate group to attach to the parent cor-
poration or to another member of the corporate family.  This ap-
proach presumes a hierarchical or pyramidal organizational structure 
and fits poorly with integrated, decentralized, collective, or multi-
dimensional decision-making structures that are found within many 
corporate groups.
133
  Secondly, as Janet Dine has observed, legal rules 
based on a strict unitary view of the corporate group ignore or even 
“destroy[] the separate identities of the companies within the group,” 
which are formed often for regulatory and tax planning reasons and 
so “may remove real business convenience.”
134
 
An alternative version of the real enterprise theory offers a po-
tential solution to this dilemma.  Building on network theory, Gun-
 
 130 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 104 (discussing such cases in contrast to vertical 
veil-piercing). 
 131 Multinational corporate groups are discussed further infra Part III. 
 132 See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 133 See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 24, at 20; see also supra note 124 and sources cit-
ed therein.  
 134 DINE, supra note 2, at 62–63; Teubner, supra note 35 at 88−89 (criticizing a uni-
tary view as deemphasizing intra-group dynamics).  
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ther Teubner and John Scott have proposed a vision of the corporate 
group as a “polycorporate network” characterized by multiple interre-
lated decision centers rather than by hierarchy.
135
  Indeed, commen-
tators observe trends toward such a “heterarchical” structure among 
multinational firms, where geographical, product-based, or function-
al centers are spread across the organization.
136
  Empirical studies also 
show that the organizational structure of many corporate groups does 
not necessarily follow a traditional hierarchy under a single decision 
center and controlling parent company.
137
  Consistent with a real en-
terprise perspective, the group or “network” itself has an identity in-
dependent from either the parent or any of the other members of 
the corporate group.
138
  Rights, duties, and legal liability can there-
fore potentially be borne by the network itself independent of the re-
sponsibilities borne by the members of the corporate group.  Even if 
the corporate group is not formerly granted legal person status, 
recognition of multiple or cooperative control structures implies that 
legal responsibility for the network could be imputed to some or all 
group members, not just to the group’s headquarters or parent.
139
 
The primary limitation of this approach is the challenge of 
providing predictability, notice, and legal certainty in the absence of 
an identifiable “seat” of legal obligation for the corporate group, 
clear standards for assigning liability among group affiliates, or even a 
uniform default definition for the corporate group itself.  These is-
sues are considered further in Part IV. 
D. Intersections of Entity and Enterprise Theories 
Part C has extended theories of the corporation to develop al-
ternative theories of corporate groups.  Of these approaches, the “ag-
gregate enterprise” approach best fits the formal legal structure of 
the corporate group as an extended “nexus of contracts.”  However, 
at a descriptive level, the “real enterprise” view better suits the reali-
ties of the corporate group as a corporate network.  If the corporate 
group is viewed, at least for some purposes, wholistically from an en-
terprise perspective, a final issue to consider is how the real entity 
 
 135 See Teubner, supra note 35 at 69−70.  See generally Scott, supra note 36.  
 136 PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 47–50 (2d ed. 
2007).  
 137 See, e.g., Birkenshaw & Morrison, supra note 126 and sources cited therein; Doz 
& C Prahalad, supra note 126 and sources cited therein. 
 138 See generally Scott, supra note 36.   
 139 See Teubner, supra note 35 at 91−92 (proposing alternative policies to opera-
tionalize a “polycorporate network” approach).  
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and aggregate entity views at the level of the individual corporation 
intersect with the real enterprise and aggregate enterprise views at 
the level of the group. 
In other words, is a “real enterprise” approach to corporate 
groups compatible with a “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation 
itself?  Or can these theories be internally consistent only if the same 
theoretical approach to the entity is applied at the level of the corpo-
rate group?  To the extent that both the corporate group and an in-
dividual corporation can be theorized as a single economic organiza-
tion or “firm,” one would expect the entity and enterprise dimensions 
of this analysis to necessarily move in tandem.  However, it turns out 
that this is not entirely so.  The analytical set is described in Figure 3 
below.  The concession theory is omitted here, given its lesser practi-
cal relevance. 
 
Figure 3: Intersections of Entity and Enterprise Theories Within  
Corporate Groups 
 
  Enterprise Theory (corporate group) 
 
 
 
Entity 
Theory* 
(single 
corporate  
entity) 
 Real Enterprise  Aggregate Enterprise  
Real 
Entity 
 
Corporate group: separate 
group identity 
 
 
Entity within the group: sepa-
rate identity independent of its 
management, shareholders, 
affiliates, and other constitu-
encies 
Corporate group: no separate 
group identity apart from that 
of its constituent entities 
 
Entity within the group: sepa-
rate identity independent of its 
management, shareholders, 
affiliates, and other constitu-
encies 
 Real Enterprise  Aggregate Enterprise  
Aggre-
gate 
Entity 
Corporate group: separate 
group identity 
 
 
Entity within the group: no 
separate identity; entity as 
“nexus of contracts” among its 
management, shareholders, 
affiliates, and other constitu-
encies 
Corporate group: no separate 
group identity apart from that 
of its constituent entities 
 
Entity within the group: no 
separate group identity; entity 
as “nexus of contracts” among 
its management, shareholders, 
affiliates, and other constitu-
encies 
*Here, the “entity” dimension refers to the nature of each individual corpora-
tion or other entity that makes up the corporate group collectively. 
 
 
In Figure 3, the upper left and lower right sectors pose little dif-
ficulty, with a similar understanding of the corporation at the entity 
level being extended to the corporate group.  For example, in the 
upper left sector, the corporate group has its own collective identity, 
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which is distinct from that of the other “real entities” that make up its 
corporate family.  An example of a legal rule that reflects this per-
spective is the corporate attorney-client privilege under federal com-
mon law.  As articulated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, the privilege attaches to the corporation itself, not to its direc-
tors, officers, or other key decision-makers.
140
  Thus, this standard re-
flects a real entity view of the corporation.
141
  Reasoning “that the 
parent (as well as the subsidiary) is the “client” for purposes of the at-
torney client privilege, federal courts and a number of state courts 
have held that the privilege is not held by a particular entity within 
the corporate structure but extends across the corporate group.
142
  
This rationale reflects a real enterprise approach to the corporate 
group as well. 
The lower right sector, the “aggregate-aggregate” section, repre-
sents the corporate group enterprise as a nexus of contracts.  Here, 
the corporate group is no more than the sum of its parts, an extend-
ed web of implicit and explicit contracts, including the contracts be-
tween parent companies as shareholders and their subsidiaries within 
the corporate structure.  Similarly, each of the constituent legal enti-
 
 140 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding that the attorney-client privilege extends to “the 
corporation” not solely to the “control group” of senior managers”); see also Bell v. 
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964) (acknowledging that a “corporation, like any 
other ‘client,’ is entitled to the attorney-client privilege” (citation omitted)).  This is 
consistent with the ethical obligations of attorneys to the corporation under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Under Model Rule 1.13, “A lawyer employed 
or retained by an organization represents the organization and not its directors, of-
ficers, or other constituents.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2011). 
 141 While this rule is most consistent with a real entity approach, it can be under-
stood from an aggregate entity perspective as well.  Under the latter view, the corpo-
ration as a legal entity is a fictional construct that possesses independent rights and du-
ties.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 142 See, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc’ns. Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 369−70 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(surveying relevant precedent on this issue).  Notably, Upjohn itself involved an inves-
tigation of potential anti-bribery violations by the company’s foreign subsidiaries and 
therefore concerned communications between the attorney and employees across 
the corporate structure.  But see Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 472−73 
(W.D. Mich. 1997) (viewing the constituent companies within the group as “joint cli-
ents”).  Some courts have also viewed affiliated corporate entities as a single client 
based on their “community of interest.”  See, e.g., id. (“The universal rule of law, ex-
pressed in a variety of contexts, is that the parent and subsidiary share a community 
of interest . . . .”); United States v. AT&T Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C. 1980) (“The 
cases clearly hold that a corporate ‘client’ includes not only the corporation by 
whom the attorney is . . . retained, but also parent, subsidiary and affiliate corpora-
tions. . . .  If the claimant of the privilege can show a substantial identity of legal interest in the 
specific matter,  it therefore makes no difference whether the two corporations were so affiliated as 
to be a single ‘client.’”.) (emphasis added).  But see In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 366 (criti-
cizing this approach).   
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ties is itself an aggregation of the contracts reached among its share-
holders, creditors, managers, employees, customers, and other con-
stituencies.  Both the group and its member entities are purely fic-
tional constructs. 
In the upper right sector, the separate legal identity of the cor-
poration is understood to reflect its real personhood but the corpo-
rate group is not—the group is simply an aggregation of affiliates that 
are linked by shareholding contracts.  Under this view, there is little 
to distinguish equity-based corporate groups from other contractual 
relationships, such as the cartel or the joint venture.  As a practical 
matter, this view implies that basic entity-based principles should 
generally apply because the proper bearer of legal rights and duties 
and the source of any collective “mind” or “will” is at the entity rather 
than the enterprise level.  For example, some states that adopt the 
federal Upjohn test—again, one that the Supreme Court grounded on 
a real entity view—adopt an aggregate enterprise view at the group 
level, seeing the two affiliates as “joint clients” rather than a single 
“polycorporate” client.
143
 
The lower left box is the only sector that represents an internal 
inconsistency between the two dimensions—it indicates a concept of 
the corporate group as having a “transcendent” identity while viewing 
each constituent entity within the group as a mere “nexus of con-
tracts.”  Yet, some common legal rules in fact fit this pattern.  For ex-
ample, the appellate court’s decision—reversed in Upjohn—adopted a 
“control group” rule of corporate attorney-client privilege that is ex-
pressly premised on the aggregate entity view and remains the rule in 
a number of states.
144
  Distinguishing natural and juridical persons, 
the appellate court concluded that since the client was an inanimate 
entity, “only the senior management, guiding and integrating the 
 
 143 In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 369−70; Glidden Co., 173 F.R.D. at 472−73 (“Numer-
ous courts have recognized that, for purposes of the attorney client privilege, the 
subsidiary and the parent are joint clients.”).  For example, New York adopts an ag-
gregate approach not based on group identity.  It requires a “common legal interest” 
to bring two entities, even affiliates in a corporate group, under the “joint client 
rule.”  See, e.g., Bowne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp, 150 F.R.D. 465, 491 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 144 United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226–27 (6th. Cir. 1979), rev’d, 449 
U.S. 383 (1981).  The control group test has been adopted in Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.  See Brian E. Hamil-
ton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629 (surveying state adoption or rejection of Upjohn); see also 
Caremark, Inc. v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 192 F.R.D. 263 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 
(applying the Illinois “control group” test of Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 
432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982)); HAW. R. EVID. 503 & cmts; OR. EVID. CODE 503(1)(d) & 
cmts.  
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several operations . . . can be said to possess an identity analogous to 
the corporation as a whole.”
145
  Although there are no cases so hold-
ing as of the time of this writing,
146
 an example of this mixed ap-
proach would arise if a state that retains the control group test were 
to apply it across corporate families on an enterprise or group basis. 
This matrix suggests that there is considerable flexibility in the 
way that understandings of the corporate group and the corporation 
intersect, and therefore, in how legal rules that apply at the entity 
level might be applied to the corporate group as a whole.  It also em-
phasizes the importance of considering, at both the entity and the 
enterprise level, which perspective is most likely to advance the policy 
goals of a given area of the law.  Where laws or regulations are in-
tended to apply broadly to all corporations—whether single entities 
or part of a larger group—the intersection of these two levels should 
be considered. 
E. The Normative Implications of Corporate Theory 
This Article has thus far introduced current theories of the cor-
poration and extended them explicitly to corporate groups.  The un-
derlying assumption behind this effort, of course, is that questions of 
corporate identity matter to the development of legal rules.  Yet, this 
assumption has been challenged.  After surveying the evolution of the 
theories of corporate personhood, a number of scholars have argued 
that it is all so much ado about nothing and that theories in fact 
simply do not matter, either from a normative or positive stand-
point.
147
  This is a serious contention that merits a response. 
Beginning first from a positivist critique, they observe that at-
tempts to map the three theories and their variations systematically 
against the evolution of legal principles historically have been unsuc-
cessful as either a descriptive or predictive matter.
148
  One reason is 
 
 145 Upjohn Co.,  449 U.S. at 390 (quoting Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d at 1226) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 146 For states adopting the control group test, see supra note 144.  As of Oct. 27, 
2011, no court had decided whether to adopt a “joint client” (i.e., aggregate) or 
“community of interest” (i.e., enterprise) approach at the group level.   
 147 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63; Phillips, supra note 1 (reviewing, inter alia, 
Dewey’s consequentialist and indeterminacy arguments); see also Dewey, supra note 1, 
at 669, 673 (pointing to the reemergence of each view over time as evidence of the 
“irrelevance” of theory).    
 148 See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1494 (arguing that the evolution of various 
corporate law principles “could easily have been varied by positive law under any of 
the different theories” and that “[w]hat mattered was the practicalities” driving dif-
ferent doctrinal areas). 
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that, as David Millon has observed, the link “between corporate theo-
ry and doctrinal and social developments is, in fact, more complex” 
than a unidirectional causal relationship.
149
  He notes that “[w]e have 
yet to develop an adequate account of corporate theory’s [legitimat-
ing] function,” that is, its role in bolstering emerging regulatory or 
policy developments.
150
  Another reason is that the complexity, diver-
sity, and ongoing evolution of organizational forms makes tracing 
these theories’ influence empirically difficult.  One of the best syn-
theses of the historical evidence is perhaps Millon’s own conclusion 
that the relationship between corporate theory and social practice is 
best understood as interdependent and mutually legitimating.
151
 
While corporate theory may not itself suffice to legitimate new legal 
forms or rules, neither is it irrelevant to their evolution. 
A second challenge is that both academic commentary and the 
courts have yet to distill a single, elegant theoretical understanding 
that captures the corporation’s complex and multifaceted identity 
(though network theory and the conventional contractarian view 
both come close).  Critics also note that while each position’s advo-
cates claim normative superiority, the actual implications of the theo-
ries are more muddled.
152
  Understandings of the corporate group 
are evolving even more slowly.  This argument, in essence, is that 
corporate theory is indeterminate, lacking any definitive meaning or 
normative impact.
153
 
Given that the corporate form is used by a wide range of firms—
from close corporations to the global conglomerate—achieving a sin-
gle unifying view of corporate identity may well be an impossible or 
even undesirable goal.  Indeed, the different pragmatic and policy 
concerns underlying different areas of the law necessitate grounding 
in alternative visions of corporate (or group) identity.  As a result, 
competing corporate theories can coexist across different doctrinal 
arenas, as explored later in this Article. 
 
 149 See Millon, supra note 1, at 241 
 150 See id. (responding to arguments by Horwitz, supra note 1). 
 151 See id. at 243. 
 152 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1 (arguing that corporate theory is of little rele-
vance to corporate social responsibility and that each of the theories of corporate 
personhood have been used to support divergent and even competing normative 
claims).  But see Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) 
(drawing on multiple theories to advance a conception of the corporation as having 
a moral, economic, and even “spiritual” dimensions).   
 153 For the competing positions on the “determinacy” of corporate theory, see 
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 175–76; Millon, supra note 1, at 243–51. 
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Moreover, as Part III demonstrates, within particular cases—even 
cases touching, for example, on fundamental constitutional rights—
assessments of corporate rights and duties cannot be severed from 
the courts’ fundamental understandings of what, in fact, the corpora-
tion, and by extension, the corporate group, actually is.  Indeed, the 
broad influence of the nexus of contracts vision of the corporation 
on corporate law itself demonstrates the impact of theory on the evo-
lution of legal rules.  In a given social and economic context, then, 
theories of the corporation can have determinate legal or political 
significance.
154
  If perceptions of corporate identity in fact matter to 
case outcomes, then it is important to consider the potential norma-
tive implications of the competing theories and how these normative 
claims might apply to the corporate group. 
1. The Concession Theory 
Normative conclusions are easiest to draw under a concession 
theory of the corporation.  Created by the state, corporations were 
accountable to the sovereign, or in the case of the United States, ul-
timately to the electorate, to carry out the largely public purposes for 
which they were formed.
155
  In addition, states used the corporate 
charter to impose limits on corporate (mis)conduct and on the eco-
nomic power of the corporation, which gave them direct power over 
the corporation to advance the public welfare.
156
  Because of the con-
cession theory’s emphasis on the obligations of the corporation and 
its skeptical view of corporate power, some scholars have argued that 
modern corporate law should revive this lost understanding of the 
corporation as a force for producing both social and economic 
wealth and reintroducing a sense of public duty to the corporation.
157
 
2. Aggregate Theories 
An aggregate theory of the corporation, in contrast, is grounded 
on the freedom of contract of the contributors to the corporate en-
terprise.  Accordingly, this theory is associated with the notion that 
the purpose of the corporation is inherently private rather than pub-
 
 154 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 175–76; cf. Millon, supra note 1, at 241–51 (contend-
ing that normative implications of the theories can only be observed specifically in 
hindsight and are otherwise continually evolving). 
 155 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949–50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Framers . . . took it as a given that corpora-
tions could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.”). 
 156 Id.; see also Mitchell, supra note 63, at 1491–92 (noting that early general incor-
poration statutes initially maintained many of these limits).  
 157 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 7. 
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lic.
158
  Therefore, any responsibility of the corporation must derive 
from the expectations of the corporation’s constituencies and, par-
ticularly, their contract with the shareholders as residual claimants to 
the firm’s assets.
159
  If shareholder wealth maximization is the con-
tracted-for objective of the corporation, the normative standard by 
which corporate conduct should be judged is in fact economic rather 
than moral, making economic efficiency the surest path to maximiz-
ing shareholder and firm wealth, and ultimately, societal wealth.
160
 
Some have broadened the normative implications of aggregate 
approaches by arguing that the terms of the corporate contract inure 
to the benefit of a wider range of constituencies.
161
  For example, 
Blair and Stout’s Team Production Theory of the firm posits that the 
firm has contractually obligated itself to a broad range of contribu-
tors to the corporate enterprise, including employees and even credi-
tors.
162
  Their theory is not only consistent with the standard “nexus of 
contracts” vision of the corporation but also with a contractually 
grounded notion of corporate social responsibility.
163
 
The fact that aggregate theories can support such divergent 
views has led some to argue that the theory’s normative implications 
are ambiguous.
164
  Nonetheless, even such critics admit that the nexus 
of contracts (i.e., aggregate) view of the corporation commonly is re-
garded as having at least one solid moral implication,” that is, that “it 
makes specifically corporate moral responsibility impossible.”
165
  Be-
cause the corporation has no “real” identity, any moral responsibility 
must rest with its individual directors, officers, or shareholders of the 
corporation, if at all.  Similarly, at the level of the corporate group, 
moral obligation can be attributed solely to the individual directors 
and officers who serve on behalf of a specific corporate entity within 
the group.  Since the corporate group has no separate legal identity 
under U.S. law, any legal obligations that apply at the enterprise level, 
for example under federal securities laws, must therefore be justified 
solely on efficiency grounds. 
 
 158 See Millon, supra note 1, at 220−40. 
 159 See generally Jill Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (reviewing the foundations of shareholder prima-
cy). 
 160 For a classic articulation of the traditional approach, see EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 35−39. 
 161 See supra notes 84−85 and sources cited therein.  
 162 See Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 250.   
 163 Id. at 253−54.   
 164 See Millon, supra note 1, at 241−51; Phillips, supra note 1, at 242.  
 165 Phillips, supra note 1, at 242.  
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Whether an aggregate enterprise perspective is compatible with 
corporate social responsibility or stakeholder accountability as a 
normative objective depends on how the nature of the group con-
tract is understood.  If controlling shareholder interests are para-
mount, then the normative objective of the corporate group is to 
maximize their wealth.  Thus, for example, in Delaware, the directors 
of wholly owned subsidiaries are obligated to manage the subsidiary 
in the interests of the parent and its shareholders.
166
  However, share-
holder economic interests are more likely to be diffuse in any organi-
zational structure with minority shareholders at some level within the 
group.  It is even more difficult to extend a stakeholder-oriented ag-
gregate approach to the corporate group.  Such an approach re-
quires the “nexus of contracts” to include all of the constituencies 
(i.e., employees, creditors, and local communities) associated with 
every member of the corporate group—a potentially unlimited set.  
Moreover, it is unclear how the mediating function of subsidiary 
boards would be reconciled with their (varying) fiduciary duties 
across multiple jurisdictions.
167
 
In sum, the aggregate theory emphasizes the economic interests 
of the firm’s constituents and, particularly, its shareholders’ interests 
over moral or ethical obligations.  For corporate groups, it implies 
that the legal rules directed at the corporate group should be those 
that improve the economic efficiency of the group.  This objective 
may be different for some corporate groups than maximizing share-
holder wealth at the parent level or advancing stakeholder or minori-
ty shareholder interests at the subsidiary level. 
3. Real Entity & Enterprise Theories 
In his account of the emergence of the real entity view in the 
early 1900s, Millon notes that when corporations came to be seen as 
“private” entities with an identity separate from the state, they were 
“assimilate[d] . . . to the status of natural persons.”
168
  As a result, he 
writes that “[c]orporate law . . . lost much of its public character” and 
regulatory limitations previously imposed on corporations by state law 
were eliminated, while rights previously limited to natural persons 
 
 166 See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 
(Del. 1988).  
 167 Under a Team Production Theory of the firm, the board of directors serves as 
a “mediating hierarch” among the competing interests of the firms’ constituencies.  
Blair & Stout, supra note 85, at 250−55.  Extended to the group level, this approach 
implies that directors of each affiliate would mediate the interests of the parent cor-
poration, the group as a whole, and the separate constituencies of that entity.   
 168 Millon, supra note 1, at 213 
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began to be extended to corporations.
169
  Historically, the real entity 
view was associated with an expansion of corporate rights and a nar-
rowing of corporate duties. 
However, because the real entity theory conceives of the corpo-
ration as sharing the attributes of individuals, it has also been ad-
vanced, both in those early years and by more recent commentators, 
as offering a stronger grounding for conceptions of corporate morali-
ty.
170
  This implies that the corporation can itself be found morally 
culpable, although whether the source of such moral obligations de-
rives from universal norms of human behavior or from narrower 
norms that are collectively determined remains a subject of debate.
171
  
Advocates of the real entity view also emphasize its potential to 
ground tighter regulatory controls of the corporation, stronger vol-
untary commitments to corporate social responsibility, and a better 
“fit” between the corporation’s duties and its rights.  For example, the 
real entity theory was used in the 1930s by E. Merrick Dodd to advo-
cate duties of the corporation to constituencies other than share-
holders.
172
 
To be sure, at a practical level, the power of the corporation to 
act independently from its shareholders as a “real person” is possible 
only if its directors enjoy decision-making discretion, as permitted 
under state corporate law.
173
  The autonomy such rules give to corpo-
rate directors can permit them to consider the interests of broader 
constituencies, such as employees, local communities, or the envi-
ronment.
174
  Indeed, Berle and Means, whose seminal work on the 
rise of the modern corporation rests on an aggregate view that em-
phasizes the property interests of shareholders, recognized this di-
mension of the separation of ownership and control and ultimately 
concluded that the modern corporation must develop as a system 
that operates in the public interest, balancing the interests of diverse 
constituencies.
175
  However, it is not inevitable that directors will in 
fact exercise their discretion in consideration of “public” (i.e., stake-
 
 169 Id. 
 170 See Millon, supra note 1, at 216−20 (discussing Merrick Dodd’s extension of en-
tity theory to ground notions of corporate citizenship); Phillips, supra note 1, at 241’.   
 171 See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Law: 
The Case of Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises, in THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 431, 436–39 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007).  
 172 See Phillips, supra note 1, at 241; Millon, supra note 1, at 216−20.   
 173 See supra note 87. 
 174 See Lawrence Mitchell, The Board as a Path to Corporate Social Responsibility, in 
THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 171, at  207, 283.   
 175 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 78, at 312−13. 
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holder) as well as “private” (i.e., shareholder) interests.  In fact, a di-
rector primacy model of corporate governance may also be the best 
way to advance shareholder wealth maximization, the same normative 
objective espoused by advocates of an aggregate theory of the corpo-
ration.
176
 
But the possibility that the aggregate and real entity theories 
might point in the same direction is a critique going more to empiri-
cal questions of how directors and officers exercise their discretion.  
At the level of normative principles, a real entity approach clearly 
parts course from aggregate theories by positing the corporation as 
having an identity, and possibly even a will or moral center, such that 
it can ground collective culpability apart from any wrongful act or in-
tent of its directors and officers.
177
 
Abstracting to the level of the corporate group, then, a real en-
terprise perspective implies that the group as a whole bears rights and 
obligations that either derive from those of one or more members of 
the group or may also be independent.  The derivative liability of the 
group or one entity within the group, based on wrongful conduct by 
another affiliate has been generally rejected within veil-piercing doc-
trine in order to preserve limited liability within the group.
178
  It is, 
however, accepted within the major statutory regimes that currently 
operate on an enterprise-wide basis; in these areas, derivative liability 
is supported by general agency principles of attribution.  The emer-
gence of multilateral and transnational regulatory, monitoring, and 
enforcement mechanisms that approach the corporate group as a 
single enterprise rest on similar foundations.
179
 
One challenge for a real enterprise approach is identifying the 
source of the group’s moral obligation, will, and intent.  Where an 
independent legal structure represents the group, or where the 
group is organized hierarchically so that a parent company or head-
quarters serves as a unitary “nerve center” for the organization, moral 
 
 176 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 87 (advocating a view of the board of directors 
as the center of corporate identity and will, that is, as a “real nexus of contracts”).   
 177 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1, at 242 (arguing that this conclusion is of little 
practical importance, since situations where there is “collective fault but individual 
blamelessness” are in practice quite rare).  Yet it is easy to imagine examples of col-
lective inaction where ordinary negligence of individuals produces wrongful acts or 
omissions by the organization as a whole.   
 178 See generally Thompson, supra note 100.   
 179 See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Cynthia Williams & Li-wen Lin, The Roles of Standardiza-
tion, Certification, and Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 4 COMP. RES. L. & POL. 
ECON. 1 (2008); see also infra notes 306−07 and accompanying text (identifying multi-
lateral initiatives). 
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and legal obligations of the group may be attributable to that entity.
180
  
However, further work is needed to explain how collective legal or 
moral obligation might be assigned among constituent firms within 
the group in light of the diversity of organizational and decision-
making structures adopted by corporate groups. 
III. CORPORATE GROUP THEORY IN THE COURTS 
Although concepts of corporate identity have been debated for 
quite some time, these issues have recently regained national atten-
tion.  This Part traces the theories of the corporation and of corpo-
rate groups that were developed above through the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Citizens United v. FEC
181
 and its more recent decision in Janus 
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.
182
  It then examines Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Shell, which at the time of this writing is pending before 
the Court and raises key questions about the nature of the corpora-
tion under international law.
183
 
These cases illustrate how theoretical perspectives on the per-
sonhood of the corporation influence case outcomes and how entity-
based views of the corporation fall short when extended to corporate 
groups.  These examples are not intended to canvass the entire range 
of issues involving corporate groups or to survey all of the analytical 
approaches courts may take.  However, they highlight how under-
standings of the nature of corporate groups vary across different doc-
trinal domains.  By examining how theories of the corporate group 
illuminate some of the tensions in these decisions, this Part also sug-
gests how enterprise-based perspectives might better guide courts in 
similar cases. 
A. Citizens United v. FEC 
In 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, sought to 
shape the historic campaign for the Democratic presidential nomina-
tion.  It produced the film Hilary: The Movie, a documentary that por-
trayed then-candidate Hilary Clinton in a less-than-favorable light.
184
  
Realizing that the project might fall afoul of federal limits on corpo-
 
 180 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (defining the corpora-
tion’s “nerve center”). 
 181 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).  
 182 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  
 183 See infra Part III.C (discussing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2010) and Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013 
(7th Cir. 2011)). 
 184 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.  
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rate campaign expenditures, Citizens United sought a preliminary in-
junction against the enforcement of the restrictions and a declaratory 
judgment, both of which were denied.
185
 
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, and in January 
2010 the Court found the challenged limits on corporate campaign 
expenditures unconstitutional.
186
  In so doing, the Court overruled its 
earlier decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,  which had 
upheld expenditure limits on corporations.
187
  Citizens United elicited 
strong reactions from the public and from commentators, and its im-
plications for constitutional law, corporate jurisprudence, and broad-
er public policy debates have proven far-reaching.
188
   
An established principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is 
that campaign expenditures are speech and indeed “political expres-
sion” that lies “at the core . . . of First Amendment freedoms.”
189
  In 
Citizens United, the core question before the Court was the extent to 
which restrictions on the political speech of juridical persons, includ-
ing corporations and labor unions, could be imposed consistent with 
the First Amendment.
190
  The Court held that no distinction can be 
made between natural persons and corporations for purposes of the 
First Amendment and that corporations’ right to freedom of speech 
 
 185 Citizens United challenged federal restrictions imposed under § 441b of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), as amended by the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 
Stat. 81, 91 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).  These restrictions prohibited cor-
porations or unions from “using their general treasury funds to make independent 
expenditures on speech [that is] an ‘electioneering communication’ or for speech 
that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate.”  Citizens United, 130 S. 
Ct. at 887.    
 186 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. 
 187 494 U.S. 652 (1990).    
 188 The Citizens United decision prompted President Obama to take the unusual 
step of criticizing a Supreme Court decision publicly, which he did in his 2010 State 
of the Union speech.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 
2010), in 156 CONG. REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010).  In response to widespread 
public outrage about the decision, legislation was also proposed in Congress to re-
confirm that corporate expenditures by foreign-owned companies are within the ex-
isting ban on election expenditures by foreign nationals.  See 2 U.S.C. § 441(e) 
(2006); see also Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Election 
Act (DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. § 102 (2010).  Most recently, a petition 
has been filed with the SEC urging adoption of corporate political contribution dis-
closure requirements in the wake of Citizens United.  See Editorial, Serving Shareholders 
and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at A22.   
 189 Austin, 494 U.S., at 656–57 (internal citations omitted). 
 190 The Court had previously recognized the First Amendment rights of corpora-
tions in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978).  
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under the Constitution is coextensive with that of natural persons.
191
  
In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion drew on multiple 
perspectives of corporate personhood without acknowledging the in-
herent contradictions among those approaches.
192
  It also disregarded 
the extension of its holding to corporate groups whose voices are 
most likely to shape the landscape of future elections. 
Corporations are nowhere mentioned in the text of the Consti-
tution, and the question of whether particular constitutional rights of 
“citizens”
193
 or “the people” 
194
  should be extended to corporations 
has not been answered systematically by the Court.  The analysis typi-
cally turns on whether the rights at issue are “purely personal” and 
therefore limited to natural persons—an inquiry which depends “on 
the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional pro-
vision.”
195
  Although corporations now enjoy many constitutional 
rights that are deemed to run to the entity itself, recent commentary 
observes the utter lack of a unified doctrine.
196
 
 
 191 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898−908.  The Court upheld the constitutionality of 
federal disclosure requirements and left intact the longstanding federal ban on di-
rect corporate campaign contributions under 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971.  Id. at 901–02, 908.  
 192 For further commentary on the conceptions of corporate personhood reflect-
ed in the Citizens United decision, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1; Darrell A. H. 
Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional 
Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate 
Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 497 (2011); Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens United, Corporate 
Governance and Managing Risks (Weinberg Ctr. for Corporate Governance Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 01-11, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1766583. 
 193 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl., art. III, § 2. 
 194 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 2. 
 195 This test was articulated by Justice Powell in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (stat-
ing that corporations generally enjoy Constitutional protections other than 
“[c]ertain purely personal guarantees” (citation omitted)).  
 196 Miller, supra note 192, at 909.  Miller describes the Court’s jurisprudence as a 
“grab bag of history, metaphysical rumination, Lochnerian tailings, and pragmatism to 
resolve the specific corporate constitutional claim at hand . . . . a string cite rather 
than a doctrine.”  Id. at 909.  He summarizes the state of corporate constitutional 
rights as follows:  
Today, corporations possess some First Amendment free speech and 
press rights, some rights of expressive association, and (perhaps) some 
right to free exercise. They enjoy Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches but only a limited right to privacy. Corporations 
possess Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy and takings 
but no rights against self-incrimination. The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees corporations a right to trial by jury and to counsel but not a right 
to appointed counsel. Corporations are “citizens” for purposes of Arti-
cle III powers, but not “citizens” for purposes of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause.  Corporations are “persons” with Fourteenth 
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The Court’s fundamental holding—that corporation are “speak-
ers” entitled to voice in the political process on par with individual 
citizens—clearly espouses a real entity conception of corporate per-
sonhood.  Relying on its pre-Austin line of cases, which had invalidat-
ed corporate campaign expenditure restrictions, the Court repeated-
ly referred to the corporation as having its own “voice” and message 
that should not be restricted in the marketplace of ideas.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded, “[S]uppressing the speech 
of . . . corporations . . .  prevents their voices from reaching the pub-
lic.”
197
  In so doing, the Court also distinguished the corporation’s 
“voice” from that of its shareholders.  It concluded that any interest 
in protecting shareholders from being compelled to promote the 
corporation’s political views through their investment dollars was in-
sufficient to justify restricting the corporation’s political speech.
198
  The 
speech rights of shareholders who do not approve of corporate 
speech, the majority wrote, can be addressed “through the proce-
dures of corporate democracy,” namely, director elections.
199
  In the 
majority’s view, then, the corporation has a real identity as a “speak-
er” independent from its constituents and thus indistinguishable (at 
least for First Amendment purposes) from an individual citizen. 
 
Amendment rights to equal protection and procedural due process 
and some, but not all, of the incorporated Bill of Rights. Corporations 
are also “persons” who may spend money to influence voters, but they 
cannot themselves become voters under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, 
Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth Amendments.  
Id. at 910–11 (internal citations omitted). 
 197 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 198 See, e.g., id. at 911 (concluding that a potential disagreement by a media corpo-
ration’s shareholders “with the political views the newspaper expresses” do not justify 
“restrict[ing] the media corporation’s political speech” (emphasis added)); see also John 
Coffee, Corporate Governance After Citizens United, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2010, at 2 (ob-
serving that this argument implies that all federally required securities disclosures are 
compelled speech).  The argument that corporate campaign contributions force in-
vestors to subsidize “compelled political speech” is based in part on the fact that, pri-
or to Citizens United, corporations were not required to disclose these contributions to 
investors, preventing them from exiting investments in companies that contribute to 
campaigns they oppose.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Po-
litical Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (advocating for heightened 
review of corporate political speech decisions under state corporate law); Tucker, 
supra note 192, at 514, 533–41 (outlining the compelled speech arguments in Citizens 
United).  More than a dozen states have introduced new disclosure rules in the wake 
of Citizens United.  Kenneth P. Doyle, More States Passing Disclosure Laws in Response to 
Citizens United Ruling, BNA CORP. L. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2011.  
 199 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794).  But see id. at 
977−79 (noting the inability of corporate law to provide an adequate remedy) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); see also Tucker, supra note 192, at 533−41 (explaining the limits 
of effective remedies to the compelled speech challenge). 
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However, another rationale relied on by the Citizens United ma-
jority reflects instead an aggregate view of the corporation that em-
phasizes the underlying rights of the shareholders and other individ-
uals constituting the corporate entity.  Similar reasoning had been 
previously followed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, a pre-Austin First 
Amendment case.
200
  There, the Court had held that limits on inde-
pendent associations’ campaign expenditures restricted the speech 
rights of their members.
201
  In the same vein, the Citizens United major-
ity concluded that the challenged restrictions on corporate speech 
represent a “ban [on] the political speech of millions of associations of 
citizens.”
202
  Elsewhere, the Court also acknowledged concerns that 
corporate speech might reflect the views of shareholders, some of 
whom might be foreign nationals.
203
   
At the same time, the majority failed to clarify how the corpora-
tion is itself a “speaker” if its speech and its rights to speak are merely 
derived from its constituents.  More critically, it failed to explain its 
understanding of which constituents’ voices the corporation repre-
sents.  As the dissent observed, corporate officers and other employ-
ees do not voice their own personal views when they speak as agents 
of the corporation.
204
  Yet as noted above, the Court equivocated on 
the issue of whether the corporation’s voice is the voice of its share-
holders.  Corporate law does not permit the shareholders to “dictate” 
the corporate “message” to the board of directors or management, 
nor can it be assumed that shareholders of large public corporations 
share identical interests, particularly political views, that could be 
otherwise imposed on the corporation itself.
205
  This lack of connec-
tion between corporate voice and any specific constituency may indi-
cate that the Citizens United majority ultimately holds a real entity view 
 
 200 424 U.S. 1, 25−26 (1976). 
 201 Id. at 22. 
 202  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (emphasis added); see also id. at 928 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in 
association with other individual persons.”).    
 203 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (“We need not reach the question of whether 
the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or asso-
ciations,” that is to say, “corporations or associations that were created in foreign 
countries or funded predominately by foreign shareholders” from “influencing our 
Nation’s political process.”).  Federal law already imposes such restrictions.  See 2 
U.S.C. § 441(e) (2006).  The constitutionality of these restrictions was recently up-
held. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011) (rejecting a First Amend-
ment challenged based in part on Citizens United), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
 204 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens J., dissenting in part). 
 205 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008) (discussing divergence of shareholder interests). 
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of the corporation, but this position is inconsistent with the opinion’s 
stated rationale, which rests on individual speech rights. 
The Court in Citizens United considered only in passing the im-
plications of its holding for corporate groups.  A key rationale behind 
Austin was that the unique economic and legal characteristics of cor-
porations heightened the risk of corruption and the possibility of 
corporate “voice” dominating political debate.
206
  In discounting the 
Austin Court’s concerns of corporate expenditures “distorting” politi-
cal debate, the Court pointed to media conglomerates as corporate 
organizations quintessentially at the core of First Amendment protec-
tions despite their ability to amass wealth in support of particular 
messages.
207
  Reflecting a real enterprise approach, the Court’s opin-
ion throughout assumes that media conglomerates speak with one 
voice.
208
  The majority also sympathized with concerns that campaign 
expenditures by the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent might “speak” 
with the voice of its parent or controlling shareholder.
209
  This too 
implies a real enterprise perspective, that is, a view that a U.S.-based 
corporate entity within a corporate group might not “speak” with its 
own “voice” (in dollar terms) but rather on behalf of the entire cor-
porate family. 
A real enterprise view of the corporate group as a speaker in its 
own right is consistent with the Citizens United holding.  It also com-
ports better with the reality of corporations’ ability to promote a uni-
fied corporate image, brand, and “message,” the complex nature of 
corporate decision-making, and the common law fiduciary duties of 
corporate directors and officers.  As acknowledged by the dissent, 
corporate “voice” does not necessarily reflect the views of any corpo-
rate constituency, whether it is the shareholders, directors, officers, 
 
 206 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990) (up-
holding restrictions on corporate political expenditures).  The Court also rejected 
the policy argument found persuasive by the Austin majority that restrictions on cor-
porate spending were necessary to prevent corporations “from obtaining ‘an unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace’ by virtue of their economic wealth.”  Id. at 
659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).  The 
Court held that “First Amendment protections do not depend on the speaker’s ‘fi-
nancial ability to engage in public discussion.’”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 
(quoting Buckley v. Valejo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)). 
 207 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905−06 (noting that media corporations are ex-
empted from BCRA’s ban on corporate expenditures). 
 208 See, e.g., id. at 911 (considering circumstances where shareholders of a media 
corporation might oppose “the political views the newspaper expresses” but finding 
such interests insufficient to justify restricting the corporation’s political speech (emphasis 
added)). 
 209 See supra note 203 and accompanying text (addressing concerns about poten-
tial foreign influence on federal elections). 
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or other employees.
210
  Distinguishing corporate “voice” from the 
corporation’s human constituents in this way might have influenced 
the Court to credit concerns about corporate power and the potential 
distortion and “drowning out” of individual voice, but the majority 
opinion soundly rejects these rationales. 
The corporations whose “voice” the majority explicitly sought to 
protect are “small corporations without large amounts of wealth,” 
which make up the majority (in numbers but not in dollar terms) of 
corporate taxpayers and employers.
211
  However, when corporate do-
nors are in fact corporate groups, they are no longer associations of 
individuals but associations of other corporations—in other words, 
“polycorporate networks.”  Although the corporate group, too, is a 
(larger) association of individuals, citizens’ expectation of communi-
cating politically through the corporate form is certainly attenuated 
when they know that their participation (i.e., investment) will be fil-
tered through a corporate group.  Had citizens’ expectations been 
understood this way, the risk of restrictions on individual voice might 
have posed less of a concern to the Court. 
Once the group is understood to be the speaker, critical ad-
vantages corporations enjoy over individuals, such as “limited liabil-
ity . . . perpetual life, and . . . favorable treatment of the accumulation 
and distribution of assets” might also have weighed more heavily in 
the majority’s analysis.
212
  Instead, the Court interpreted its earlier de-
cision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti to prohibit “restrictions 
distinguishing among different speakers.”
213
  Taking into account an 
enterprise perspective might have motivated the Court to credit the 
anti-distortion rationale of Austin over the anti-discrimination ra-
tionale of Bellotti. 
A final issue in Citizens United concerns the boundaries of the 
corporate group.  Advocates of the limitations on corporate “speech” 
had argued that the corporation’s ability to establish a political action 
 
 210 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (noting that 
because the corporation’s personhood is only “a useful legal fiction” and that corpo-
rations are not “members of ‘We the People’,” but neither is the corporation speak-
ing for its human constituents; observing further that “[i]t is an interesting question 
‘who’ is even speaking when a business corporation places a[] [candidate] adver-
tisement”).  
 211 Id. at 907 (majority opinion)(citing evidence that ninety-six percent of the 
members of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have less than one hundred employ-
ees). 
 212 See id. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)(citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658−59 (1990)). 
 213 Id. at 898−99 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 
(1978)).  
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committee (PAC) through which expenditures could be made al-
ready gave the corporation an avenue to express its views, a position 
supported by the Court’s earlier decision in Austin.
214
  Adopting a real 
entity view of the PAC, the Court rejected this argument.  It empha-
sized the corporation’s formal legal separation from its PAC as cut-
ting off any means for the corporation to meaningfully “speak” in po-
litical campaigns.
215
  Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that the 
challenged prohibition on corporate independent expenditures was 
an “outright ban . . . notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a 
corporation can still speak, for a PAC is a separate association from the 
corporation.”
216
 
To be sure, corporations are prohibited from contributing cor-
porate treasury funds to the PAC.
217
  However, the Court could have 
found the PAC to be part of the corporate group—a real enterprise 
approach—while still recognizing the independence of the PAC as a 
“separate segregated fund” holding non-corporate assets contributed 
by others.  Viewed this way, the PAC is analogous to a minority subsid-
iary, and its views could be identified both with the founding corpo-
ration and with direct PAC contributors.  The Court declined to do 
so, despite the fact that a corporate PAC is formed, supported, and in 
fact controlled by the corporation.218  Interestingly, under campaign fi-
nance law, separate PACs of a parent and a subsidiary are consolidat-
ed for purposes of applicable funding limits.
219
  The regulations view 
these separate PACs as affiliated with a single “enterprise,” even 
though as a matter of campaign finance law, the Court determined 
that the voice of the PACs is not the voice of the corporate group it-
self. 
 
 214 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660−61.  PACs established by corporations or unions may 
engage in “express advocacy” and “electioneering communications.”  2 U.S.C. § 
441b(b)(2) (2006). 
 215 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 8 at 897–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).   
 216 Id. at 882 (emphasis added). 
 217 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006). 
 218 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d) (2012) (“A corporation . . . may exercise control over its 
separate segregated fund.”). 
 219 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(4)–(5) (2006); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(g)(2), 110.3(a)(2)(i) 
(2011); see Walther v. FEC, 468 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.D.C. 1979) (“[I]f two or more 
PACs are controlled by one person or one group of persons, then the PACs should 
be treated as one PAC for purposes of controlling political contributions.”).  The 
D.C. Circuit has recently held limits on certain individual contributions to PACs un-
constitutional as applied, though without particular reference to the rules on parent-
subsidiary consolidation.  SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(challenging the individual contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(a)(1)(C) and 
441(a)(a)(3)). 
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Whatever its deficiencies in other respects, the Citizens United 
opinion rings true in its implicit understanding of the corporation as 
conveying messages that cannot be identified with any individual or 
group of individuals within the corporation.  Yet the majority opinion 
failed to adequately consider the implications of its holding for large 
corporations—that is, corporate groups.  The majority opinion also 
illustrates how the Court has drawn on competing theories of corpo-
rate personhood to ground its decisions in constitutional cases.  The 
tensions between these views led the Court to give undue weight to 
the “nondiscrimination” rationales of Bellotti and to unduly discount 
Austin’s concerns about the potential distortive influence of corpo-
rate campaign expenditures. 
B. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders 
Less than a year after Citizens United, the Supreme Court in FCC 
v. AT&T, Inc. confirmed that its concept of the “real” personhood of 
the corporation did not automatically extend to other contexts, par-
ticularly where federal statutes provide guidance to the contrary.
220
  
This result is consistent with the evidence presented elsewhere in this 
Article of considerable variation in courts’ views of the corporation 
and the corporate group across different areas of the law.  In Janus 
Capital, decided in June 2011, the Supreme Court again confronted 
questions of corporate identity but in the very different context of the 
federal securities laws. 
221
 
Janus Capital involved claims under Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5
222
 by shareholders of Janus Capital 
Group, Inc. (JCG) against JCG and its wholly owned subsidiary, Janus 
Capital Management, LLC (JCM).
223
  Rule 10b-5 under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 makes it unlawful for “any person, directly or 
indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact” in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
224
  JCM served as 
the investment advisor to Janus Investment Fund (the “Fund”), spe-
 
 220 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) (rejecting AT&T’s argument that it had a “personal pri-
vacy” interest in certain law enforcement records under exemption 7(C) of the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)). 
 221 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 222 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 223 Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2299–300. 
 224 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (emphasis added).  Rule 10b-5 implements Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which makes it “unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
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cifically a Massachusetts business trust, which was owned entirely by 
the mutual fund’s investors.
225
  The JCG shareholders alleged that be-
cause the investment advisor JCM, acting under the control of JCG, 
“participat[ed] in the writing and dissemination” of misleading 
statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectus, JCM was in fact 
the “maker” of the statements and thus a direct violator of Rule 10b-
5.
226
  When the misleading nature of the statements was publicly re-
vealed, investors withdrew funds from the Janus Investment Fund, 
which caused a decline in the value of JCG stock as well.
227
 
The decision in Janus Capital Group hinged on whether the 
Court would adopt an “enterprise” analysis with respect to JCM and 
the Fund and required the Court to consider the contours of the 
corporate group.  Like Citizens United, the case also raised questions 
regarding the source of corporate speech but in a statutory rather 
than a constitutional context. 
In contrast to the constitutional arena, cases involving the exten-
sion of statutory rights and obligations to corporations begin from 
the definition of “person” in the statute at issue.  In most federal stat-
utes, “person” is defined to include corporations and other organiza-
tions.
228
  Few statutes explicitly define the corporate group.
229
  Wheth-
er a court approaches the corporate group from an enterprise or 
entity perspective generally depends upon its interpretation of the 
text and purpose of the statute as they pertain to the (i) “the nature 
of the group interrelationship, consisting of the intertwined structure 
and operations,” and (ii) the importance of enterprise principles to 
furthering “the objectives of the law in the legal area involved.”
230
  
Where the statutory regime contains provisions specifically directed 
at corporate groups, the statutory definition of “control” and general 
 
 225 Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.   
 226 Id.    
 227 Id. at 2299−300. 
 228 See, e.g., Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (defining “person” as used in fed-
eral statutes to include corporations and other business organizations).  
 229 See supra Part II.A and note 32.  The term “affiliate” is however defined in nu-
merous contexts.  See, e.g., infra note 236 and accompanying text.  A number of regu-
latory regimes use other terms to delimit the corporate group, such as “integrated 
enterprise” under federal labor law, the “unitary business” doctrine under constitu-
tional law, and “enterprise” under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  See Phillip Blumberg, The Corporate Entity 
in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 345−60 (1990). 
 230 BLUMBERG, supra note 2, at 119 (noting that this is also the general standard 
courts use to determine whether common law rules should apply on an enterprise or 
entity level). 
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agency principles will generally dictate whether an enterprise or enti-
ty analysis applies.
231
 
Under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
“[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable” 
for violations of the securities laws is also subject to liability.
232
  Section 
20(b) imposes liability on violations accomplished through interme-
diaries.
233
 The definition of “control” under the securities laws is ex-
pansive and is “to be construed liberally” in light of the remedial 
purposes of the statute.
234
  It is defined broadly as “the possession, di-
rect or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”
235
  Federal securities regula-
tions define an “affiliate” as “a person that directly, or indirectly 
through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or 
is under common control with” another.
236
 
In Janus Capital, the identity of the “maker” of the misleading 
statements depended on whether the relationship between the de-
fendant entities was viewed from an entity or enterprise perspective.  
The parties had acknowledged that JCG “controlled” its wholly owned 
subsidiary JCM, as defined by Section 20(a).  Accordingly, JCG would 
have been an indirect violator of Rule 10b-5 if JCM had been found 
directly liable since the two would be deemed to have “made” the 
statements as a single speaker—an enterprise view.
237
  However, Jus-
tice Thomas, writing for the 5-4 majority, concluded that the relation-
ship between JCM and the Fund did not fit within the definition of 
 
 231 See id. at 101, 119. 
 232 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 233 Id. § 78t(b). 
 234 See, e.g., Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 235 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(b) (2012) (emphasis added) (defining “control” under the 
Securities Act of 1933); see, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying 
this definition for purposes of controlling person liability under Section 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Harrison, 974 F.2d 873 (same); SEC v. Int’l Chem. 
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (defining control within the definition of an 
underwriter under Securities Act Section 2(11)); see also 17 C.F.R. § 260.0-2(b) 
(2012) (adopting the same definition under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 
U.S.C. § 77aaa). 
 236 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2012) (defining “affiliate” under the Securities Act of 
1933); see also id. § 260.0-2(f) (adopting the same definition under the Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. 77aaa).  This definition is also part of the definition of 
“affiliated person” under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 
80a-2(3) (West Supp. 2011). 
 237 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 n.5 
(2011). 
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“control” under Section 20(a) and that JCM did not otherwise have 
“direct” or “ultimate” control over the misleading statements.
238
  Ac-
cordingly, the majority held that JCM could not be held liable for any 
Rule 10b-5 violations of the Fund itself.
239
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a formalistic en-
tity-level view of the corporate structure.  It relied primarily on the 
fact that corporate formalities were observed in the formation and 
operation of the Fund, that JCM and the Fund were not under com-
mon ownership, and that the prospectus was filed solely in the name 
of the Fund.
240
  In addition, only one of the Janus Investment Fund 
directors was simultaneously a director of JCM, making the Fund’s 
board of trustees “independent” of JCM, as required by the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (the ‘40 Act).
241
  The Court thus adopted 
a real entity approach of the Fund as an independent speaker, with 
its board exercising “ultimate control” over its communications.
242
 
Like the PAC in Citizens United, the formally independent mutual 
fund structure at issue in Janus Capital lies near the outer edge of 
what might be considered an enterprise under core conceptions of 
the corporate group—it is similar in many respects to a joint venture 
or other contractual relationship.  However, as the dissent noted, 
JCM employees implemented the Janus Funds’ strategies and han-
dled its daily operations, and all the officers of the Janus Investment 
Fund were also officers of JCM—the Fund was in fact a “captive” mu-
tual fund.
243
  Without joint ownership or direct board control, the 
Fund was formally, if not functionally, independent of JCM in the 
eyes of the Court.  Viewed in this way, the relationship between the 
mutual fund and JCM was defined by services and other contracts, so 
the Court could simply view the fund as a client who had hired an in-
vestment advisor and its management team—not part of the same 
corporate group. 
Under this view of the corporate group then, JCM as an inde-
pendent third party could be liable only for aiding and abetting the 
Fund’s 10b-5 violation—an act for which no recognized private right 
 
 238 Id. at 2305. 
 239 Id. at 2299, 2304. 
 240 Id. at 2304. 
 241 The ICA permits up to sixty percent of the board of a mutual fund to be com-
posed of “interested persons.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(19) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).   
 242 Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 243 Id. at 2306 (Breyer J., dissenting); see Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 
1418, 1421 (2010) (acknowledging the lack of practical independence between mu-
tual funds and their investment advisers and referring to mutual fund clients estab-
lished by an affiliate of the adviser as “captive mutual funds”). 
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of action exists.
244
  Alternatively, the Janus majority left open the pos-
sibility that an investment advisor such as JCM could be held liable 
under Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act in circumstances where the 
captive mutual fund might be an “innocent intermediary” of fraud by 
JCM.
245
  Absent such a claim, the only way to render investment advi-
sors directly liable for misleading disclosures they prepare may then 
be to require them to separately execute or attest to them, as John 
Coffee has proposed.
246
 
In contrast, the dissent argued, in essence, that JCM and the 
Fund should be viewed as a real enterprise—that is, as a single 
“speaker” collectively communicating through the Fund prospectus.
247
  
Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, observed: “Nothing in the Eng-
lish language prevents one from saying that several different individ-
uals, separately or together, ‘make’ a statement that each has a hand 
in producing.”
248
  Even though the core indicia of the corporate 
group were lacking for purposes of indirect liability as a controlled en-
tity under Section 20(a), for the dissent, the two entities could none-
theless be viewed as contributing to a collective communication—
essentially, the product of a joint enterprise. 
Had the Court adopted an aggregate enterprise approach em-
phasizing the interests of the Fund investors (which did not include 
JCM), it might also have concluded that their implicit (and likely ex-
plicit) contract with the Fund included an agreement that JCM would 
“speak” on the Fund’s behalf by supplying its officers and manage-
ment services and producing its required disclosures.  Either enter-
prise approach might better have advanced the regulatory goals of 
Rule 10b-5 to protect investors and ensure the accountability of in-
vestment professionals.  Instead, the majority ruling allows investment 
advisers to insulate themselves from Rule 10b-5 liability for captive 
 
 244 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994).  
 245 See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10.  In Janus, the plaintiff had not made 
any alternative claims under § 20b of the Exchange Act.  Id. at 2311 (Breyer J., dis-
senting). 
 246 See John C. Coffee, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court and Securities Litigation, N.Y. L.J., July 
21, 2011. 
 247 See Janus Capital, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the is-
sue is not whether JCM is indirectly liable under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act 
for control of the guilty Fund but whether JCM is itself “directly liable” as the maker 
of the statements).  
 248 Id. at 2307. 
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mutual funds that they manage to an extent not permitted by the 
Court’s earlier rulings.
249
 
The flexibility conferred by modern corporate and investment 
law, contract, and the diversification of business entity forms has 
made defining clear boundaries for the corporate group or firm as a 
unified enterprise difficult.  Janus Capital illustrates the types of prin-
ciples courts look to in considering whether to view independent en-
tities as part of a single enterprise and the policy implications of a 
strict entity-based approach. 
In many contexts, there are good reasons to limit the bounds of 
the corporate group to entities linked by direct equity interests and 
control.  First, this narrow approach gives due regard to the formal 
legal structure of the group.  Second, it distinguishes unified enter-
prises more clearly from general agency relationships.  Third, it is the 
combination of ownership and control that contributes to the effi-
ciency of the corporate group as an organizational form even as it 
creates the potential for abuse.  Hence, the need for regulatory inter-
vention.  While not justified everywhere, Janus Capital shows, howev-
er, that in some contexts, such as securities law, the interrelationship 
between the entities involved as well as the incentives that an entity-
based rule creates might justify broader perspectives of the corporate 
group.  In this regard, the Janus Capital majority’s position illustrates 
the limits of control-based definitions of the corporate group, while 
the dissent shows how other factors—such as decision-making control 
and oversight authority—support a more expansive view. 
C. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
Thus far, this Article has considered the corporate group with-
out reference to multinational enterprises.  However, many of the 
most challenging regulatory and policy debates surrounding corpo-
rate groups arise because of their global reach.  Any consideration of 
the nature of the corporate group must therefore consider the inter-
sections of domestic and international legal regimes.
250
  At the time of 
this writing, a decision is pending before the Supreme Court in the 
case of Kiobel, which raises the issue of corporate status and identity 
under international law.
251
  The case applies customary international 
 
 249 Id. at 2308 (questioning the majority’s reading of First Interstate Bank of Denver). 
 250 For a more complete treatment, see generally MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2; 
Reuven Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, 
Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5 (2003). 
 251 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).  The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in the Kiobel case on Oct. 17, 2011.  Kiobel v. Royal 
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law in one of the few contexts where it has direct bearing on the obli-
gations of global corporate groups—human rights litigation under 
the Alien Tort Statute.
252
 
1. The Multinational Challenge 
There is no uniform definition of a multinational, and its 
boundaries are not necessarily limited to the legal structure of affili-
ated entities linked by shareholdings.
253
  The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses the term “multi-
national enterprise” (MNE) to refer to “companies or other entities 
established in more than one country and so linked that they may 
co-ordinate their operations in various ways.”
254
  The United Nations 
defines the “transnational corporation,” a generally parallel term, as 
“an economic entity [or entities] operating in two or more coun-
tries—whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or 
country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively.”
255
  
 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491).  The case was heard with 
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F. 3d 604 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011) 
(No. 11-88), a case involving similar issues under a related statute, the Torture Vic-
tims Protection Act.   
 252 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (giving district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”).  Ac-
cording to an exhaustive survey conducted by Michael Van Alstine, there are in fact 
at least 115 federal statutes requiring the courts to interpret and apply standards de-
fined with reference to international law.  See E-mail from Michael P. Van Alstine, 
Professor of Law, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to Virginia Harper Ho, Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Kansas Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:07 AM) (on file with author).  
However, the vast majority concern maritime law and the law of war and are of less 
direct relevance to multinationals outside related industries.   
 253 See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, at 57–82; see also ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 9, ¶ 2 (2008), available at  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (“Multinational enterprises, 
like their domestic counterparts, have evolved to encompass a broader range of 
business arrangements and organisational forms.  Strategic alliances and closer rela-
tions with suppliers and contractors tend to blur the boundaries of the enterprise.”). 
 254 See ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION & DEV, OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 17, ¶ 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf (noting that “a precise defini-
tion of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of the Guide-
lines”).  
 255 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, ¶ 20, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/160/08/PDF/G0316008.pdf?OpenElement 
(approved by U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Protection of Human Rights 
Res. 2003/16, Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
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In this Article, however, the term is used more narrowly to refer to a 
corporate group linked by shareholding rather than contractual rela-
tionships.
256
 
According to the United Nations’ 2011 World Investment Re-
port, multinational corporate groups currently account for one-
fourth of the world’s gross domestic product and one-third of all 
global exports.
257
  A recent report on the role of corporate groups in 
Europe observed that “the international group of companies—not 
the single company—has become the prevailing form of European 
large-sized enterprises.”
258
  In the United States, multinationals also 
account for a significant percentage of the national economy.
259
 
As a matter of organizational structure, management, sheer eco-
nomic power, and indeed, identity, global corporate groups can be 
viewed most consistently from a real enterprise perspective as 
“polycorporate business networks.”
260
  Regardless of whether they are 
recognized as having independent “citizenship” or formal legal status 
within a given jurisdiction, corporate groups operate with a collective 
identity that is often embodied in a global brand or other symbol of 
corporate identity.  From a management standpoint as well, multina-
tional corporate group operations are characterized by the global co-
ordination of legally independent parts to advance a common eco-
nomic strategy.
261
  Indeed, these realities are consistent with theories 
 
Enetreprises with Regrad to Human Rights, 55th Sess., Aug. 26, 2003, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11, at 52 ( Aug 26, 2003)).   
 256 This view is in line with other commentators who use the term “multinational 
corporation” to refer to firms that “invest directly in foreign facilities and hold man-
agement accountable for foreign activities” rather than all firms engaged in contracts 
with foreign parties.  See, e.g., DINE, supra note 2, at 41 (citations omitted).  
 257 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., June 
27–29, 2011, World Investment Report 2011, at xiii (July 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2011-Full-en.pdf.    
 258 ANTUNES ET AL., supra note 27, at 59.  
 259 See, e.g., JONATHAN CUMMINGS ET AL., MCKINSEY, GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ROLE OF ITS MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, (2010), available 
at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/role_of_us_multinational_companies/
index.asp (reporting that as of 2007, U.S. multinationals accounted for one percent 
of all U.S. companies but contribute twenty-three percent of all private sector GDP). 
 260 For a discussion of the term “polycorporate network,” see supra notes 135−39 
and accompanying text. 
 261 Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 556; see also supra note 126 and sources cited 
therein (analyzing strategic considerations impacting multinational group struc-
tures); ANTUNES ET AL. supra note 27, at 59 (concluding that “group management is 
the heart of the [multinational enterprise]: the main reason for its success consists in 
the sophisticated and flexible management issuing from the optimal combination of 
central control exercised by the parent and local autonomy granted to subsidiaries.”)  
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of the firm based on transaction cost economics wherein corporate 
groups can be understood as unified economic organizations. 
Although the rise of multinational corporate groups has de-
linked corporations from ties to geographic and regulatory jurisdic-
tions, international and domestic legal regimes remain territorially 
bounded.
262
 This has enabled multinationals to engage in regulatory 
arbitrage, shifting operations and assets to the most favorable (i.e., 
weakest) regulatory jurisdictions, and in asset partitioning, strategical-
ly shielding corporate assets by isolating riskier operations in separate 
legal entities, each with limited liability.
263
  Ultimately, the juxtaposi-
tion of geographically bounded sovereign nation-states as regulators 
and the emergence of business entities whose operations transcend 
such boundaries has weakened the power of any one state to regulate 
the corporation as a whole.
264
 
Theories of the corporate group offer a new way to articulate 
this well-known dilemma⎯namely, that a transnational corporate 
group in fact exists as a “real enterprise” in an ontological sense be-
yond the bounds of its legal structure but that current regulatory 
tools can respond only at the level of the group’s constituent parts, in 
other words, an “aggregate enterprise” approach. This regulatory gap 
is most evident in the rising number of claims by involuntary tort 
creditors against major multinationals.
265
  One of the most prominent 
of the recent cases raising such claims is Kiobel.  
2. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and Alien Tort Claims 
Jurisprudence 
From 1993 to 1994, Nigerian military forces engaged in a cam-
paign of murder, rape, and destruction against local activists in the 
Ogoni region of Nigeria who had protested the environmental im-
 
 262 The challenges of regulating multinationals through traditional territorially 
grounded legal regimes have been much noted.  See, e.g., MUCHLINSKI, supra note 2, 
at 123−71 (analyzing the jurisdictional limits of MNE regulation through national or 
regional law); Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 543−44 (noting that “emerging patterns 
of economic globalization . . . expose the limitations of theorizing that is grounded 
on . . . principles” of territoriality and a hierarchy of legal sources premised on the 
ultimate authority of the state or sovereign); Hansen, supra note 119; Detlev F. Vagts, 
The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
739 (1969). 
 263 See, e.g., Catá Backer, supra note 2, at 543 (on asset partitioning and its ration-
ales); Iacobucci & Triantis, supra note 31.  
 264 See, e.g., id. 
 265  A recent Westlaw search of all reported cases litigating Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) claims since 1997 revealed that of a total of 645 cases, over 500 involved cor-
porations (search conducted Apr. 12, 2012). 
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pact of oil exploration.
266
  They did so allegedly at the behest of and 
with the direct assistance of a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Petroleum 
and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC.
267
  After litigation 
spanning more than fifteen years,
268
 a panel of the Second Circuit 
held in September 2010 that corporations, as juridical entities, are 
not “persons” under international law and therefore cannot be sued 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).
269
  Like nearly every other circuit 
to consider the question, the Second Circuit had previously assumed 
without deciding that the ATS recognized corporate defendants.
270
  
Only the Eleventh Circuit had squarely confronted the issue, and it 
had upheld corporate liability under the ATS.
271
  Since Kiobel was de-
cided, the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have ex-
pressly ruled on the issue of corporate liability under the ATS.
272
  All 
have sided with the Eleventh Circuit and rejected the position taken 
by the Second Circuit panel majority. 
On July 8, 2011, the D.C. Circuit first rejected Kiobel’s conclu-
sions in Doe v. Exxon Mobil, a case involving alleged torture, murder, 
and various torts committed by Indonesian military personnel hired 
as security by Exxon Mobil to guard its natural gas facility in Aceh, 
 
 266 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 267 Id.  Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (SPDC) is the Ni-
gerian subsidiary of the other named corporate defendants.  Id. at 123.  Plaintiffs, 
Nigerian citizens, alleged that Dutch, British, and Nigerian companies, which were 
engaged via a multi-layered corporate structure in oil exploration in 1993, paid the 
government and provided transport to the Nigerian army, which raped and mur-
dered civilian activists.  Id.   
 268 Litigation by residents of the Ogoni region of Nigeria commenced on Novem-
ber 6, 1996, in the case of Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 
2000).  Kiobel had been pending nearly a decade by the time the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to hear the case in October 2011.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrole-
um Co., No. 1:02cv07618 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2002) (initial class action filing). 
 269 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 112–13.  
 270 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010); see also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 
Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999) (entertaining claims against a corporate de-
fendant where no challenge to corporate liability was raised).  The Fourth Circuit 
recently considered claims against corporate defendants under the ATS where de-
fendants failed to raise a timely challenge to the use of the ATS against corporate de-
fendants.  Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011).   
 271 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (follow-
ing Romero for the proposition that “corporate defendants are subject to liability de-
fendants under the ATS”); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th 
Cir. 2008).  
 272  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 2011 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. petition filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3335 (U.S. 
Nov. 23, 2011) (No. 11-649).   
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Indonesia.
273
  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decis ion in  Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., the court refused to distin-
guish between individual and corporate defendants for purposes of 
ATS liability.
274
  Three days later the Seventh Circuit followed suit in 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., a case against Firestone affiliates 
involving alleged child labor in Liberia.
275
  Judge Posner, writing for 
the Seventh Circuit in Flomo, concluded that so long as the corpora-
tion’s actions are condoned at the “decisionmaking level,” the corpo-
ration as a juridical person may be held liable under the ATS.
276
  An 
en banc opinion of the Ninth Circuit reviewing ATS claims against 
Rio Tinto recently reached a similar conclusion based in part on the 
lack of specific language within the ATS or any legislative history sug-
gesting congressional intent to limit the ATS to claims against natural 
persons.
277
 
These cases are among the most recent in a long line of claims 
brought against U.S. and foreign multinationals in the United States 
under the Alien Tort Statute.
278
  The Alien Tort Statute, which was 
enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, con-
fers subject matter jurisdiction on U.S. federal courts to hear tort 
claims by foreign plaintiffs based on violations of the “law of nations” 
or customary international law, such as piracy, crimes against human-
ity (including genocide), and torture.
279
  The ATS is a statute of 
unique provenance and has few parallels in other legal systems.
280
  
The ATS was revived, ironically enough, by the Second Circuit in the 
 
 273 Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11. 
 274 Id. at 50 (“[T]he ATS ‘by its terms does not distinguish among classes of de-
fendants.’” (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 438 (1989))). 
 275 Flomo, 643 F.3d 1013. 
 276 Id. at 102−13. 
 277 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 747–48.   
 278 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (giving district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations”).   
 279 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713, 715, 724 (2004); see also id. at 730 
(“[T]he ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.”).  Custom-
ary  international  law  may be defined as the “[p]ractice  of  states . . . that   law   
‘made   over   time   by   widespread   practice   of governments acting from a sense 
of legal obligation’ . . . and ‘gradually  ripening  into  a  rule  of  international  
law.’”  Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 42 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmt. b.; LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS 
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1979); The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900)). 
 280 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the ATS a 
“legal Lohengrin” of which ”no one seems to know whence it came”). 
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case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
281
  Since 1997, it has become a primary 
vehicle for foreign plaintiffs seeking compensation for violations of 
international law.
282
 
Footnote twenty in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court’s 
only interpretation of the ATS, lies at the heart of Kiobel and the cases 
challenging its holding.  It states: “A related consideration is whether 
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a giv-
en norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private 
actor such as a corporation or individual.”
283
  The question of whether 
Sosa requires a threshold jurisdictional finding that corporate liability 
is itself a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm of customary in-
ternational law is itself a matter of some dispute.
284
  However, all of 
the appellate decisions reviewed here conclude that post-Sosa, the 
question of who can properly be named a defendant is a matter that 
must be determined with reference to customary international law.
285
 
Based on an analysis of international criminal law and the prac-
tice of international criminal tribunals from Nuremburg to the Inter-
national Criminal Court, the Second Circuit panel in Kiobel conclud-
ed that individuals, but not corporations, are “subjects of customary 
international law”
286
: “‘subjects’ [of international law are] those that, 
to varying extents, have legal status, personality, rights, and duties un-
der international law and whose acts and concerns are the principal 
concerns of international law.”
287
  Thus equating personhood with sta-
tus as a “subject” of international law, the court concluded that only 
individuals have such a status and therefore only they bear rights and 
duties under international human rights law.
288
  The Second Circuit 
 
 281 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).   
 282 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (accepting, for the first time, ATS claims 
against a corporate defendant).  
 283 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20. 
 284 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (quot-
ing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732, and related authorities); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting 
with approval lower court authority that “actionable violations of international law 
must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory” (internal citation omit-
ted)); see also Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort 
Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 357−63 (2011) 
(analyzing precedent and commentary on the issue). 
 285 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128–30 & n.33 (analyzing Sosa and later appellate authorities 
on this issue). 
 286 Id. at 148−49.   
 287 Id. at 126−27 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, at 70) (emphasis added by the court).  
 288 Id. at 148−49.  
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thus interpreted international law as mandating a view of the corpora-
tion diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the Court, as a mat-
ter of domestic law, in Citizens United.
289
  The issue of corporate liability 
under the ATS and the related question of the corporation’s status 
under international law were squarely presented to the Supreme 
Court on appeal, and at the time of this writing are pending resolu-
tion.
290
 
Kiobel illustrates the classic aggregate entity view of the defend-
ant-parent corporations as fictional entities.  The Second Circuit em-
phasized that corporations act through individuals, and finding no 
clear principles of attribution within international law, concluded 
that corporations are incapable of committing crimes under interna-
tional law.
291
  This implies that while the corporation as a “juridical 
person” has a legal identity,
292
 it has no “real” personhood apart from 
that of the individual executives and employees through whom it op-
erates.  Accordingly, the court concluded that moral culpability for 
any violations of international law must rest, if at all, with the individ-
ual directors and officers of the named corporate defendants.
293
 
The extent to which non-state actors, including individuals and 
corporations, are properly considered “subjects” of international law 
is a matter of some debate.
294
  Indeed, the Flomo and Exxon Mobil opin-
ions, as well as amici curiae writing in support of the Kiobel plaintiffs, 
strongly dispute the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Nurem-
berg trials specifically and the status of the corporation under cus-
 
 289 To be sure, as Judge Cabranes noted in Kiobel, the doctrinal basis for the two 
holdings is entirely distinct.  Id. at 118, n.11 (“The history of corporate rights and ob-
ligations under domestic law is, however, entirely irrelevant to the issue before us—
namely, the treatment of corporations as a matter of customary international law.”). 
 290 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010) (raising the 
questions of whether corporate civil tort liability under the ATS is a merits question 
or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and (ii) whether corporations may be sued 
as a defendant under the ATS for violations of the law of nations), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 472 (2011).   
 291 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 118–20, 147–49. 
 292 Id. at 147−49.  
 293 Id.    
 294 See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 175−77 (5th ed. 2003) (survey-
ing the debate); JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 72−76 (2006) (also surveying the debate and noting that there is now 
“much greater recognition of the role of ‘non-state actors’ [including] companies . . . 
within the international community”);  Ku, supra note 284, at 377, 373–89 (surveying 
the literature on corporate liability under international law and arguing that “the 
question of private corporation liability is far from universally settled under custom-
ary international law”).   
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tomary international law generally.
295
  The D.C. Circuit, in particular, 
goes to great lengths in Exxon Mobil to trace the history of corporate 
civil and criminal liability under international law.
296
  Both find that 
under international law, the corporation is itself a bearer of rights 
and duties, which can be breached by its agents.
297
  The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s en banc opinion in Sarei v. Rio Tinto concurs.
298
  These cases, 
then, reflect a fundamentally different view of the nature and status 
of the corporation under international law, and one that more closely 
resembles a real entity approach. 
Consistent with standard tort and contract principles, the adju-
dication of ATS claims necessitates a strict entity approach that focus-
es on the tortfeasor directly responsible for the harm caused.  Be-
cause of the evidentiary challenges of connecting a parent company 
or its directors and officers directly to those harms, however, the ma-
jority of ATS cases rely on aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or other 
indirect theories of liability.
299
  None of these approaches reach the 
enterprise level because all disaggregate liability within the corporate 
group.  Accordingly, all of the recent appellate decisions similarly ap-
proach the issue of liability in tort from an entity perspective, focus-
ing on the indirect liability of the defendant parent companies rather 
than on the corporate enterprise as a whole. 
Despite the inevitability of an entity-level view in ATS cases, a re-
al enterprise approach is relevant to courts resolving emerging issues 
in these types of disputes and others concerning the human rights 
practices of MNEs.  First, as many commentators have noted, the 
courts have thus far failed to develop a consistent standard for indi-
 
 295 See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 
2011) (noting that I.G. Farben, the German chemical cartel, was dissolved and its as-
sets made “available for on the authority of customary international law”); Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Brief for Nuremberg Schol-
ars Omer Bartov et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6813570. 
 296 See Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 41−54. 
 297 See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017–21; Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 41 (“[T]he court 
may assume that individuals acting as agents of a corporation violated substantive in-
ternational law norms.  The question is whether a corporation can be made to pay 
damages for the conduct of its agents in violation of the law of nations.”). 
 298 671 F.3d 736, 747–48. (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (adopting the reasoning of 
Judge Leval’s concurrence in Kiobel), cert. petition filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3335 (U.S. Nov. 
23, 2011) (No. 11-649) .  
 299 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Andrei 
Mamolea, The Future of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute: A Roadmap, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (2011).   
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rect liability in ATS cases, “leading to confusion in the lower courts 
and persistent uncertainty for litigants.”
300
  At present, the Second 
Circuit has adopted a high standard requiring proof that the corporate 
defendant acted with “purpose” to aid and abet the tortious conduct,
301
 
while the D.C. Circuit in Exxon Mobile Corp. espouses a lower 
“knowledge” standard as the test most consistent with customary in-
ternational law.
302
 
Yet standard agency principles aimed at attributing liability with-
in a single corporation become more challenging when applied glob-
ally.  As Judge Posner observed in Flomo, the question of the scope of 
corporate liability⎯that is, how far vicarious liability on a respondeat 
superior theory may extend⎯is uncertain.303  Equally difficult is the 
question of whether the intent or knowledge of agents of indirect 
subsidiaries of a corporate defendant can be imputed through a 
chain of ownership or control to a defendant parent corporation.
304
  
The purpose and knowledge standards differ significantly in this re-
spect.  Unless the defendant parent corporation directed the chal-
lenged conduct, the purposeful intent of agents far lower in the cor-
porate structure is unlikely to be shared across an enterprise and 
must be imputed to higher-level corporate agents for liability to at-
tach.  In contrast, if a knowledge standard applies, the fact that deci-
sion-making, disclosure, risk management, and other internal con-
trols integrate information-sharing across a firm implies that plaintiffs 
may be able to satisfy a knowledge test for affiliated entities on an en-
terprise theory without having to establish its imputation from one 
affiliate to the next within the corporate group. If in fact the D.C. 
Circuit’s interpretation of customary international law as establishing 
a “knowledge” standard is correct, then its application may turn on 
 
 300 Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 61, 62 (2008) (discussing the challenge “multiple and overlapping legal orders” 
pose to claims of corporate complicity in human rights violations generally and this 
point in particular). 
 301 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260, 277 (“[A] defendant may be held liable under 
international law for aiding and abetting . . . when the defendant . . . “does so with 
the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime.”) (Katzmann, J., concur-
ring); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d 244, at 258−59 (adopting Khulumani’s 
approach). 
 302 Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 32. 
 303 Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he theory [of respondeat superior] attenuates when the employees include local 
residents of Third World countries.”). 
 304 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d. at 161 (noting the challenges such 
issues present when the defendant corporation is a minority shareholder). 
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whether courts see defendants that are related entities from an en-
terprise or an entity perspective. 
In addition to questions of intent, the potential for corporate 
civil liability under international human rights law, apart from the li-
ability of any individual director or officer, implies a collective moral 
obligation whose source cannot be examined from an aggregate en-
terprise approach.  Legal claims in other areas of international law, 
such as environmental law, may also soon require the courts to view a 
defendant corporation (read “corporate group”) holistically as a “real 
enterprise.”
305
 
These questions have gained new urgency in light of recent in-
ternational initiatives to promote greater accountability for multina-
tional corporate groups through multilateral collaborative enforce-
ment networks, voluntary or self-regulatory monitoring structures, 
and stakeholder-driven strategies that intersect with traditional regu-
lation.
306
  For example, on June 16, 2011, the United Nations formally 
endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, a 
framework under which businesses have an ongoing due diligence 
obligation with respect to the human rights impacts of the business’ 
operations.
307
  Recent trends toward enterprise-wide risk manage-
ment
308
 are similarly grounded on an understanding of the corporate 
group as a “real enterprise.”  Even if limited liability and traditional 
common law principles are presumed, the fact that corporate groups 
now face real reputational, legal, and ultimately economic risks from 
human rights violations abroad on an enterprise-wide basis calls for 
 
 305 The ATS has been used as a jurisdictional “hook” to ground claims under in-
ternational environmental law, although none have succeeded to date.  See, e.g., 
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).  See generally 
Luis E. Cuervo, The Alien Tort Statute, Corporate Accountability & the New Lex Petrolea, 19 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 151 (2006) (analyzing the applicability of the ATS to environmental 
torts). 
 306 See generally ANN MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Pierre-
Hughes Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 
113 (2009); Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 179. 
 307 See Special Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy Frame-
work, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011), available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17.31.pdf (identifying 
MNEs’ “obligations to respect” human rights).  Other examples include the United 
Nations Norms for Transnational Corporations, the Global Compact, and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  See What Is the Global Impact, U.N.: GLOBAL 
IMPACT, www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2012); supra notes 254−55.   
 308 See, e.g., Michelle Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1323 (2010) (reviewing such trends before and after the global financial crisis). 
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further research on allocation of oversight responsibility and related 
governance questions as applied to corporate groups. 
D. Enterprise Principles: A Synopsis 
The selected cases reviewed here show that judges’ views of the 
nature of the firm⎯both of the corporate form generally and, more 
importantly for present purposes, corporate groups⎯affect their ap-
plication of legal rules and their conclusions about policy choices 
raised by corporate activities.  At the same time, how it does so is less 
clear.  The cases reveal a lack of systematic and consistent application 
of corporate theory even within discrete doctrinal arenas. In Citizens 
United, this discontinuity appears within the majority opinion itself.  
While these examples may suggest that judges are simply drawing on 
the theory that best suits their intended conclusion, they clearly show 
that corporate theory is not determinative in a mechanistic sense and 
that there is a need for courts to use greater care when drawing on 
corporate theory. 
The opinions also demonstrate that even if limited liability and 
other fundamental characteristics of the corporate form are pre-
sumed, enterprise perspectives lead to new ways of approaching deci-
sions involving corporate groups. However, even where the nature of 
the corporation and the scope of its rights and obligations are direct-
ly at issue, the Court has failed to directly confront the distinctions 
between the conduct of individual corporate entities and that of a 
larger enterprise or group, as the First Amendment cases make clear.  
Part of the challenge courts face is that there are, as of yet, few clear 
rules regarding the attribution of responsibility for collective deci-
sion-making within and across a corporate group.  While the Court 
has been willing, as in Citizens United, to endorse the concept of col-
lective rights, such as the right to “speak” as a firm, Janus Capital and 
Kiobel highlight the difficulty of doing so across formal entity and ju-
risdictional boundaries.  Finally, Kiobel emphasizes a third tension, 
unresolved by the Court, between the rights and duties of the corpo-
ration under domestic and international law. 
The cases do, however, suggest the key questions that should be 
part of the analysis.  First, should corporations enjoy the same rights 
and bear the same duties as natural persons?  If so, should enterprise 
principles apply to the corporate group or should the analysis be lim-
ited to the level of the entity?  And finally, should the law reflect an 
aggregate enterprise that focuses on shareholder (and/or other con-
stituents’) interests or is a real enterprise approach more consistent 
with common group organizational structures or “universal” moral 
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norms?  No one perspective is suited for all doctrinal domains.  How-
ever, a consistent approach within each doctrinal domain can be fur-
thered by a clear recognition of what alternative visions of the corpo-
ration imply.  At present, inconsistent understandings within even a 
single case can lead to incoherent decisions if not recognized and 
weighed in reaching a conclusion. 
Relatedly, these cases illustrate the need for clearer standards for 
delimiting the bounds of the corporate group.  Again, this can be 
done differently across discrete doctrinal areas,
309
 consistent with spe-
cific policy goals and other factors discussed in Part IV below.  Con-
cepts of control clearly are foundational, but as Janus Capital shows, 
traditional definitions of formal legal control based on common 
ownership may not be sufficient to define the bounds of accountabil-
ity in all contexts as corporate structures evolve.  In such cases, statu-
tory regimes may even reach to include contractual arrangements 
within the ambit of the “corporate group.” 
A new possibility might be to define the corporate group as a 
subset of control relationships characterized by some level of owner-
ship and perhaps other functional characteristics, such as shared per-
sonnel, joint authority over strategy, and other factors suggesting the 
group’s function as a single coordinated enterprise.  Other ap-
proaches might look beyond control to a group’s delimitation of its 
own external boundaries as a basis for allocating responsibility toward 
third parties.
310
  If the Supreme Court rules in Kiobel that corporate 
groups and other corporations are in fact “persons” as a matter of 
customary international law, there will be an even greater need for 
clear rules that predictably allocate legal responsibility among the 
corporate group itself, its parent or headquarters, and/or constitu-
ent entities across jurisdictions. 
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: DEVELOPING THE LAW OF CORPORATE 
GROUPS 
In sum, if the corporate group might be viewed differently for 
First Amendment purposes, for example, than in contract law or un-
der securities regulations, then legislatures and courts face a number 
of challenging questions within each doctrinal arena: 1) When and 
 
 309 See, e.g., Teubner, supra note 35, at 89−91 (arguing that the complexity of cor-
porate groups justifies such variation). 
 310 To the extent a group functions as an economic organization, it necessarily es-
tablishes certain boundaries even if not corresponding to formal legal categories.  See 
ALDRICH, supra note 92, at 42 (defining “organizations” as “goal-directed, boundary-
maintaining, and socially constructed systems of human activity”).   
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how should legal rights and duties attach, if at all, to the corporate 
group as a whole?  2) Should rights and duties inherent to the group 
displace, supersede, or complement the legal rights and duties of the 
group’s constituent firms? 3) Should the parent corporation serve as 
the “proxy” for the enterprise or are alternative means of allocating 
responsibility on an enterprise basis possible and desirable?  The fol-
lowing is a preliminary effort to propose basic guiding principles that 
might aid (though not complete) such an inquiry. 
A. An Entity or Enterprise Perspective? 
Existing canons of statutory interpretation offer a sound starting 
point for determining whether certain rights and obligations should 
apply at the level of the corporate group.  For example, under the se-
curities laws, as noted earlier, conceptions of control, which help de-
fine the boundaries of the corporate enterprise, should be interpret-
ed broadly in light of the investor protection objectives of the 
securities regulations.  Since companies are already required to satisfy 
consolidated reporting requirements and related accounting rules, 
consistency and predictability can be enhanced, not undermined, by 
directing regulation at the level of the consolidated group.  There-
fore, if as in Janus Capital, questions regarding the existence, scope, 
and obligations of a corporate group arise in an area of the law that 
already applies to corporate groups on an enterprise basis, such as 
the securities laws, then enterprise principles might be usefully 
adopted. 
In addition to considering the policy goals of the doctrinal arena 
at issue, whether an entity or enterprise-level analysis is most appro-
priate should also be determined based on the nature of the dis-
pute⎯namely, whether the matter involves external claims or claims 
within the group itself.  For example, corporate tax rules in the Unit-
ed States apply on an enterprise-wide basis, but particular rules that 
deal with conduct internal to the organization and are deemed to be 
necessary to the fair function of the corporate tax system, such as 
transfer pricing rules, apply on an entity basis that focuses on each 
constituent member of the corporate family.
311
  Likewise, the Upjohn 
rule governing attorney-client privilege under federal common law is 
not applied in disputes between a parent and the subsidiary or in dis-
putes between the corporation and its shareholders.  In such cases, 
the conflicting interests of the parent and subsidiary trump the 
shared interests of the corporate group that might be relevant where 
 
 311 See 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006). 
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the claim is being raised by an unrelated third party.
312
  At the risk of 
over-simplifying, in some cases, the “internal”/”external” distinction 
might also be viewed jurisdictionally.  For example, where a matter 
raises strictly local concerns unique to a certain entity in the corpo-
rate family, an entity-level approach might be most relevant, whereas 
enterprise-level rules might offer a better fit in the context of cross-
jurisdictional business operations. 
Third, pragmatic concerns matter.  The Supreme Court recently 
emphasized these considerations in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a case con-
cerning the question of corporate citizenship for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.
313
  There the Court stressed that rules extending to the 
enterprise level must be clear and susceptible of predictable applica-
tion, yet they must also be adaptive.
314
  Taking account of the dynamic 
nature of corporate group structures is particularly important be-
cause the boundaries of the corporate group are constantly chang-
ing.
315
  Adaptive standards then might best be set as presumptions 
that foster clarity and predictability where bright line tests cannot be 
adopted, but which can be overcome if particular group structures 
require. 
Established jurisdictional principles in the international arena 
and the presumption against the extraterritorial application of feder-
al statutes may dictate the potential scope of an enterprise-based 
rule.
316
  In this regard, Reuven Avi-Yonah has developed a useful ma-
 
 312 See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Nei-
ther [understanding of the] attorney-client privilege [that may apply to the corpo-
rate group] is effective in adverse litigation between the former clients [(i.e., affili-
ates)].”); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (establishing this 
exception to the general federal common law rule).   
 313 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (establishing that for diversity jurisdiction pur-
poses, the corporation’s principal place of business is its headquarters or “nerve cen-
ter”). 
 314 Id. 
 315 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 13; ALDRICH, supra note 92, at 180–
83; see also In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d at 367−68 ( “[B]ecause parent-
subsidiary relationships often change, having [different] default rules for wholly-
owned, solvent subsidiaries, and not-wholly owned or insolvent subsidiaries, seems 
unwieldy. . . .  Because of the need for clarity and certainty in privilege law creating 
multiple, ever-shifting default rules would be unwise.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
 316 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (discussing the 
presumption against statutory extraterritoriality); see also Developments in the Law— 
Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011) (surveying recent developments in 
the law of extraterritoriality).  But see Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Ex-
traterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011) (arguing, in part, that principles of interna-
tional jurisdictional law may urge or mandate extraterritorially and should be im-
plemented accordingly within U.S. law).  
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trix for analyzing whether entity-based or enterprise-based regulatory 
approaches should be adopted in different areas of the law by domes-
tic jurisdictions, either as home-states or host-states for multinational 
corporate groups.
317
  He argues that an entity approach that recog-
nizes established limited liability principles is optimal where the law 
deals primarily with local issues, such as tort and contract.
318
  Avi-
Yonah suggests that where a law’s purpose is best furthered (or can 
only be furthered) by an enterprise approach, this result can be 
achieved through the extraterritorial application of a corporation’s 
home country law in areas where there is broader consensus among 
jurisdictions and less likelihood of conflicting law and policy.
319
  Ex-
amples he cites in this area include tax, anti-corruption laws, and 
prohibitions on child labor.
320
  Avi-Yonah posits that an enterprise ap-
proach can also be achieved by international harmonization in areas 
of the law that are inherently global in scope, but where consensus 
among nations and support of the global business community are 
lacking.
321
  Examples of laws he places in this category include anti-
trust and employment discrimination laws.
322
  As his effort shows, 
concerns about the potential direct and indirect extraterritorial ef-
fects of enterprise-based rules can be predictably resolved under 
principles of comity and existing private international law doctrines. 
Finally, if an enterprise-level rule is adopted, there are certain 
normative implications that must be recognized.  The most important 
of these is the need to explain the source of any moral obligation that 
applies to complex organizations.  At the risk of eliding a deep and 
multifaceted debate, enterprise-based rules may facilitate a closer 
correspondence between the legal rights and duties of the corporate 
group than an entity-level approach.  If large corporations, that is, 
corporate groups, are more like natural persons with respect to cer-
tain rights and duties, then they should be treated from a “real en-
terprise” standpoint under the law.  For example, where MNEs influ-
ence law-making internationally
323
 and enjoy the right to bring claims 
 
 317 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 250.  
 318 Id. at 13–16. 
 319 Id. at 17. 
 320 Id. at 17–26. 
 321 Id. at 11–12, 26. 
 322 Id. at 28–31. 
 323 See generally STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 
(2007). 
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against sovereign states on an enterprise-wide basis,
324
 there is justifi-
cation for requiring them to bear commensurate obligations.  Where 
this is not the case, entity-based rules and other distinctions between 
natural and juridical persons may be equally appropriate. 
B. Allocation of Rights and Duties Within the Corporate Group 
Because the efficiency of modern corporate group structures de-
rives from certain features of the corporate form, namely, limited lia-
bility, the free transferability of shares, and the power to vote shares 
held in another corporation, any application of theories of corporate 
groups to particular areas of the law should preserve these attributes 
of the corporate form.  Standard limited liability rules, in particular, 
enable creditors to serve as specialized monitors of the particular as-
sets (including subsidiaries and/or their respective assets) of the cor-
porate group against which they have a claim without the added costs 
of monitoring the entire enterprise.
325
  Existing legal rules establish-
ing respect for corporate formalities, explicit contracts, and entity 
principles as the default rules therefore should continue to apply to 
the constituent entities within a corporate group as well. 
Phillip Blumberg has rightly observed that “intra-enterprise at-
tribution of rights or liabilities among the constituent companies of 
the group does not [“and we may add, should not] “flow from the le-
gal acceptance of an overriding concept of the group as an economic 
entity.”
326
  Nonetheless, the collective commercial activity represented 
by the group must inform any assessment of the relationship of its 
constituent companies.  Given this starting point, entity principles 
that respect the formal legal boundaries of the corporation are most 
 
 324 Dispute settlement clauses contained in all model investment agreements and 
in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that follow them provide for host-state con-
sent to arbitrator-investor claims against the host state before ICSID.  MUCHLINSKI, 
supra note 136, at 694–98, 703–46.  International investment agreements, including 
BITs, often identify the investments covered by the agreement to include investments 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a company that is a national of a party 
to the agreement; thus, the investor may include the foreign parent and any inter-
mediary investment vehicle.  See id. at 678–81 (discussing the identity of investors and 
investments covered by these agreements).  This enterprise approach gives standing 
to parent corporations to bring claims against host governments in international ar-
bitration.  See 22 U.S.C. § 1650a (2006); Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf; see 
also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 136, at 674–702 (discussing general principles governing 
BITs).      
 325 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 57. 
 326 See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 300. 
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useful in determining the contractual and other rights of the constit-
uent affiliates within the group, while analyses that involve third-party 
claims arising out of the collective activity of the group may suggest a 
more appropriate context for the application of enterprise principles.  
The latter cases might arise more readily, for example, if the corpo-
rate group has adopted an integrated decision-making structure or 
otherwise functions as a coordinated enterprise.  A real enterprise 
approach permits attribution of legal rights and duties at both levels, 
whereas any attribution to the enterprise or firm under an aggregate 
perspective must be allocated to its constituent entities. 
C. Attribution to Parent Corporations and Alternatives 
The scope of this Article does not permit consideration of when 
and where U.S. law might recognize the corporate group as an inde-
pendent bearer of rights and duties.  Acceptance of joint and several 
liability within the group based on shared decision-making, control, 
or other factors is perhaps more likely.  However, on the question of 
whether the parent corporation or another affiliate should be 
deemed the sole “proxy” for the enterprise, Hertz offers some baseline 
guidance.  It defines the “principal place of business” or “nerve cen-
ter” of a corporate group for jurisdictional purposes, as the seat of di-
rection, control, and coordination.
327
 
Ultimately, the goal of any attribution rule should be to hold de-
cision-makers accountable via direct and indirect incentive structures.  
Where a corporate group has a unitary “nerve center” in the jurisdic-
tion that has full authority over the issue at hand, treating that entity 
as a proxy for the corporate group is an appropriate solution.  For 
public companies, the listed entity generally represents the group of 
which it is a part in the listing jurisdiction.  Statutory requirements, 
like those governing public companies, might also determine wheth-
er the listed entity, even if it is not a “nerve center,” should represent 
the group on this kind of unitary attribution theory.  Where a corpo-
ration adopts a decentralized or polycentric management structure, 
current law offers less guidance.  However, standard principles of 
agency law, conceptions of comparative or joint liability in tort, and 
contractual allocations of risk within the corporate group offer possi-
ble sources of attribution rules that might be usefully adapted to such 
firms. 
 
 327 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Historically, new legal forms and corporate governance rules 
have emerged when the comparative advantage of new organizational 
modes has already been validated by the market.
328
  In other words, 
“legal structures merely reflect the underlying economic substruc-
ture.”
329
  Corporate groups, and indeed, multinational corporate 
groups have now become the dominant organizational form globally, 
yet only in specific regulatory domains has a legal framework for the 
corporate group been developed.  Given the rapid changes in firm 
organizational and management structures and in the broader econ-
omy, establishing the “corporate group” as a formal legal entity under 
state law may not promote greater flexibility or efficiency.  There is 
nonetheless a critical need for renewed consideration to those areas 
of the law where the corporate group matters and to areas of corpo-
rate law where existing rules may need to be adapted.
330
 
In considering such rules, theories of corporate groups can play 
a formative role.  However, traditional theories of the corporation 
that have been articulated only at the entity level continue to be ap-
plied by courts and analyzed by scholars as if they can be translated 
seamlessly from the entity to the enterprise level.  Yet unlike a dis-
crete business entity, the “enterprise” reflects an economic reality 
more than a legal one.  At the level of theory, the effect has been a 
gap between the literature articulating theories of corporate identity, 
described and defined most often with respect to a single legal entity, 
and work on established theories of the firm.  Moreover, recurrent 
debates over the nature of corporate identity as a matter of theory 
have begun to lose their original connection to the realities of corpo-
rate practice in a world dominated by corporate groups.  At the level 
of practice, then, when courts and policymakers look to corporate law 
to inform the development of legal rules in other doctrinal domains, 
whether in constitutional law, securities law, or human rights, they 
have been left without a coherent framework for understanding the 
nature of the corporate group when the issues at hand implicate rela-
tionships beyond formal legal boundaries. 
 
 328 Teubner, supra note 35, at 69.  
 329 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 85 (1992). 
 330 Although space does not permit consideration of concrete responses here, 
some potential applications of the theories developed in this Article to corporate law 
are addressed in a separate article.  See Virginia Harper Ho, Rethinking the Govern-
ance of Corporate Groups (Mar. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
author). 
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This Article has advanced a framework for extending traditional 
understandings of corporate identity to the level of the corporate 
group and illustrated how conceptions of the corporate group can 
impact critical case outcomes and policy choices.  It also bridges 
foundational literature on the theories of the firm and current think-
ing on corporate identity and “personhood.”  However, rather than 
derive a Grand Theory of the corporation to apply in all contexts, the 
more modest effort here has been to develop different theories that 
offer a better basis for reasoned choices in different doctrinal do-
mains where the multi-dimensional nature of the corporate group is 
an important factor in the formulation and application of law. 
Of the two primary approaches, the real enterprise view and the 
aggregate view, the former seems to offer the best fit with the multi-
dimensional nature of the corporate group.  At the same time, an ag-
gregate enterprise approach may better explain contractual relation-
ships among businesses that are not based on equity ties.  The 
complex nature of the modern corporation and of corporate groups 
makes it unlikely that any single view will be well-suited to address the 
range of policy concerns that arise in different legal domains, and in 
fact, a multifaceted approach may be more true to reality.  Each per-
spective also offers a different view of the corporate group and brings 
with it different normative underpinnings and implications that must 
be taken into account as new organizational practices and structures 
emerge. 
The role of theory then, is not to drive the new reality but rather 
to articulate it, forming a kind of stepping stone in the evolution of 
the law. Through this “reality construction,”
331
 perspectives of the 
corporate group can be developed that better take account of its 
simultaneous complexity and unity as an economic organization.  At 
the present moment, the continued integration of global business 
organizations and the world economy calls for new modes of thinking 
about corporate identity and accountability.  It is high time to revisit 
these questions from the perspective of the corporate group. 
 
 
 331 See Sugarman, supra note 24, at 13, 20 (introducing this perspective on the role 
of theory).   
